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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE  
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**Focusing America's National Powers**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the  
Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.**

**Signature:\_\_\_\_\_**

**14 April 2006**

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## **Focusing America's National Powers**

### **Abstract**

Current efforts to focus and integrate America's national powers are entwined with parochialism and a lack of coordinating, enforceable directives. The National Security Counsel (NSC) should modify its efforts to take full advantage of all sources of power to ensure national security by first establishing the NSC/Deputies Committee as the element mandated to manage the interagency process. The National Interagency Coordination Group, NIACG, should use the six-phased campaign plan as the tool to coordinate and synchronize all capabilities. It should do this by establishing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to manage the interagency process at the regional level. The NIACG also must ensure that interagency doctrine is developed to achieve unity of effort by establishing common thought, purpose, and understanding to guide actions to meet national security objectives. The JIACGs should be manned by all sources of powers, but predominantly by DoS and DoD. DoD's and DoS's culture needs to change and embrace all sources of power. DoD needs to step aside and allow other sources of power to fully contribute towards the national security effort. Additionally, all other sources of power need to stand up and accept their responsibility. Also, an interagency college needs to be established so that mid- and senior- level interagency leaders are schooled in theory and doctrine and the planning process necessary to synchronize the nation's powers. Finally, Congress needs to empower all sources of power by making funds available for emergency or contingency requirements. The implementation of these recommendations would synchronize and nest national powers in an attempt to shape aggressors towards America's will, and save lives and money by preventing war. If war becomes necessary it would quickly be resolved by a concerted effort to stabilize the

## **Focusing America's National Powers**

### **Abstract**

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# Focusing America's National Powers

## Table of Contents

<a href="#"><u>Chapter I – Introduction</u></a> .....	I-1
Proposal.....	I-1
Two Superpowers.....	I-1
Rogue States, Non-State Powers, Conventional State Powers, and Other Threats.....	I-2
<a href="#"><u>Chapter II – What is War?</u></a> .....	II-1
<a href="#"><u>Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests</u></a> .....	III-1
A Strategy of Containment.....	III-1
An International Strategy to Unite Actively Against Terrorism.....	III-3
Human Dignity.....	III-4
Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism.....	III-5
Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts.....	III-6
Prevent the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).....	III-6
Support Global Economic Growth.....	III-7
Expand Development by Opening Societies.....	III-7
Work with Other Centers of Global Power.....	III-8
Transform America's National Security Institutions.....	III-9
Conclusion.....	III-9
<a href="#"><u>Chapter IV – National Powers</u></a> .....	IV-1
Introduction.....	IV-1
Economic.....	IV-2
Diplomacy.....	IV-7
Information.....	IV-10
Military.....	IV-14
Law Enforcement.....	IV-17
Financial.....	IV-18
Intelligence.....	IV-19
Will of the People.....	IV-21
Culture.....	IV-22
Conclusion.....	IV-24
<a href="#"><u>Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process</u></a> .....	V-1
Historical Use of the National Security Council.....	V-1
The Interagency Process at the National Level.....	V-2
The Interagency Process at the Combatant	

# **Focusing America's National Powers**

## **Table of Contents**

Command Level.....	V-6
Conclusion.....	V-8
 <u><a href="#">Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating</a></u> .....VI-1	
Introduction.....	VI-1
National Level Interagency Operations.....	VI-2
Regional Level Interagency Operations.....	VI-5
Opposing Thoughts.....	VI-9
Effecting Change.....	VI-10
DoS and DoD Culture .....	VI-11
Campaign Planning to Shape the World.....	VI-13
Training.....	VI-15
Civilian Deployments .....	VI-17
National Risk.....	VI-17
Conclusion.....	VI-18
 <u><a href="#">Chapter VII – Conclusion</a></u> .....VII-1	
<u><a href="#">Bibliography</a></u> .....	A-1
<u><a href="#">Biography</a></u> .....	B-1

## Chapter I – Introduction

We--with God's help--call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.<sup>1</sup>

Osama Bin Laden on 22 February 1998

### *Proposal*

A new approach which consolidates, synchronizes, and nests all of America's capabilities must be developed to effectively utilized its national powers. If the nation's leaders would fully synchronize diplomacy, economics, information, military and other aspects of the government to impose America's will on those who threaten its vital interests, then the nation's efforts at security will be more efficient, less costly, and, ultimately, focused for the good of for all mankind.

### *Two Superpowers*

From 1945 through 1990 two superpowers stood toe to toe against each other – the United States (US) versus the Union of Soviet Socialized Republic (USSR). The US had a democratic ideology, which is a belief that governments were created to serve the people and could only act with the consent of the people. Though the USSR had a communistic ideology which preached socialism, in reality it practiced tyranny and oppression. Moscow stated that communism was the ideal form of government and would eventually supercede democratic governments. To counter this, George F. Kennan, a career Foreign Service Officer, developed the policy of “containment,” which became the US's national strategy for fighting the Cold War (1947-1991).<sup>2</sup> To contain the Soviet Union the US built a military wall around the communist world with forces in Japan, Philippines, Guam, Korea, Turkey, and Western Europe. The US Navy covered gaps where forces either could not or were not permitted with submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles

**Chapter I – Introduction**

that could reach deep into Russia. In the air the US had planes that could launch nuclear missiles. The US also had surface-to-surface nuclear missiles in hardened silos that could reach anywhere in the Soviet Union. In addition to all of this, anytime there was a conflict that involved the Soviet Union – Korea, Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan – the US either supported one side or had direct involvement. In the end, the Soviet Union, with its corrupt system, could not maintain an economy to fulfill its national strategy. Its government failed and economy collapsed, leaving the US as the only superpower.

***Rogue States, Non-State Powers, Conventional State Powers, and Other Threats***

During the Cold War diplomacy was often conducted through the might of the military in the form of surrogate campaigns such as in Afghanistan or through the economy as in an arms race. After the fall of the Soviet Union it was generally felt that peace was here at last. The US took steps to reduce its presence around the world as well as the strength of its military. Russia, because of the collapse of its economy, could no longer be as influential on world affairs. A peace dividend would surely be the result of the end of the Cold War. Instead, what transpired was that many violent states and cultures were no longer held in check by a superpower's might. Rogue states and non-state actors such as Iraq, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Somalia as well as terrorist groups such as Al-Jihad, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and al Qaeda became freer to spread their ways and ideals. Additionally, due to globalization, ease of travel, and accessibility to conventional weapons and weapons of mass effect, these rogue states and non-state powers became much more dangerous.

**Chapter I – Introduction**

According a database maintained by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), there are over 570 foreign and domestic terrorist groups.<sup>3</sup> The Department of State tracks foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) that are “responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years; groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism about which Congress was notified during the past year in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act; and any other known international terrorist group that the Secretary of State determined should be the subject of the report.”<sup>4</sup> Currently there are 40 FTOs on this list.

Further, conventional threats still exist from China, North Korea, and Iran. According to an article from Jane’s Defense Weekly, China has around 40 divisions and 43 brigades with an estimate of 2.3 million troops.<sup>5</sup> North Korea has approximately one million troops.<sup>6</sup> Iran has 345,000 troops.<sup>7</sup> Each of these countries has the conventional capability to be taken seriously as a world-class fighting force and has or is attempting to possess nuclear weapons. The US must be prepared to fight and decisively win a war force-on-force against these unpredictable states.

In addition to these threats, one of the greatest challenges the US faces today is to prevent hostile states and terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>8</sup> There are several reasons this is more of a concern today than during the Cold War. One is because of the “large quantities of Soviet-legacy weapons of mass destruction and missile-related expertise and materials remaining in the FSU (former Soviet Union) states.”<sup>9</sup> This combined with economies in disarray, the lack of strict central controls over WMD, and the money WMD can bring in the open market can lead to disaster. Another reason why WMD are more of concern now is the dual use problem

**Chapter I – Introduction**

of peaceful material that can be used militarily. Though this has always been the case, globalization has made it more difficult to manage dual use material. One example of this is a space-launch vehicle that can be turned into a ballistic missile; another example is the use of a commercial nuclear plant as a weapons facility.<sup>10</sup> A third reason of concern is that “rogue states have a smaller stake in global stability and, lacking traditional instruments of state power, seek unconventional weapons to compensate. Experts have cautioned that WMD have gone from being symbols of great-power status to a ‘poor man’s’ source of influence.”<sup>11</sup>

Terrorist groups have even a lesser stake in global stability than rogue states. Until they become legitimate, if they ever do, their modus operandi will be to intimidate people, especially through kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings.<sup>12</sup> It must be assumed by the United States that terrorist groups are seeking WMD. For example, Osama Bin Laden said the following when asked if he was trying to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons.

Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.<sup>13</sup>

A prudent US Government (USG) must also assume that if a terrorist group ever obtains this capability it will be used against the United States, its allies, and friends.

Chemical and biological weapons also threaten US security. Countries, in no particular order, that are believed to have an offensive chemical capability include Egypt, Iran, Israel, Libya, Syria, China, North Korea, Taiwan, Burma, and Vietnam.<sup>14</sup> Countries

**Chapter I – Introduction**

believed to have an offensive biological capability include Iran, Israel, Libya, Syria, China, North Korea, and Taiwan.<sup>15</sup>

The world since the end of the Cold War has truly become more dynamic, less controlled, more interdependent, more complicated, and more dangerous. Given the multiple and wide array of threats, from rogue states to terrorists to conventional armies to WMD, the US must have a united effort to protect its national interests. The US can no longer afford to manage its national powers in a splintered, stovepiped way.

Furthermore, preemptive measures must be conducted prior to hostilities by using all available powers in a united front to defend peace. To wait until the US is physically attacked could have catastrophic effects, especially if WMD are used. A new approach imbedding diplomacy, economics, information, and other aspects of the government with the military must be developed to synergize these powers. As stated in the NSS, “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America.

Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to America’s shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Frontline, “Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and Statements,” 22 February 1998, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html>, accessed 1 December 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Department of State, “Kennan and Containment,” available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm>, accessed 27 October 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Groups,” 31 October 2005, available from <http://tkb.org/Home.jsp>, accessed 30 November 2005.

<sup>4</sup> US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 27 April 2005, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm>, accessed on 30 November 2005.

17 November, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Ansar al-Islam (AI), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Asbat al-Ansar, Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA), Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG), HAMAS, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Hezbollah, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI), Al-Jihad (AJ), Kahane Chai (Kach), Kongra-Gel (KGK), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), National Liberation Army (ELN), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of

## Chapter I – Introduction

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Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Al-Qa'ida, Real IRA (RIRA), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Revolutionary Nuclei (RN), Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Shining Path (SL), Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

<sup>5</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia, "China," 7 November 2005, [http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/chins100.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=tank&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod\\_Name=CNAS&keyword=](http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/chins100.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=tank&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=CNAS&keyword=), accessed 1 December 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., "Army, Korea, North," 24 November 2005, [http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/nkors110.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=ground%20forces&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod\\_Name=CNAS&=](http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/nkors110.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=ground%20forces&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=CNAS&=), accessed 1 December 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-Gulf States, "Army, Iran," 20 April 2005, [http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfsu/irans110.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=army%20iran&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod\\_Name=GULFS&=](http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfsu/irans110.htm@current&pageSelected=janesReference&keyword=army%20iran&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=GULFS&=), accessed 1 December 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Defense Threat Reduction Agency, undated, <http://www.dtra.mil/Toolbox/Directories/CTR/index.cfm>, accessed 30 November 2005.

<sup>9</sup> National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD)-17/HSPD 4 [unclassified version], "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," December 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Michael E. Brown, ed., "Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," (Georgetown University Press, 2003), p. 40.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>12</sup> Microsoft Encarta, "Dictionary Tools," 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Frontline.

<sup>14</sup> Jane's Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, "PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION - Assessing the Risks," 15 April 2000, [http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/guides/jcdg/jcdg0014.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=wm&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod\\_Name=JCDG&=](http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/guides/jcdg/jcdg0014.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=wm&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JCDG&=), accessed 1 December 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002.

**Chapter II – What is War?**

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.<sup>17</sup>

Carl von Clausewitz

The origins of most security problems are not limited to military developments, and the solutions to security problems are rarely limited to military actions.<sup>18</sup>

Michael E. Brown

When a man first determined another possessed something he did not and subsequently decided to use force to take it, war became a part of human society. War has numerous meanings and is used by many to exemplify, as Clausewitz is quoted above, countless duels. Frequently other references are "...made to 'war against the traffic of narcotic drugs', 'class war', or 'war of nerves'."<sup>19</sup> This chapter will take the stand through a liberal interpretation of Clausewitz that war is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."<sup>20</sup> However, there are several sources of force (or power). They commonly include diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME). Therefore, based on this liberal interpretation of Clausewitz, the use of any one of these to compel an enemy to do our will may be construed as an act of war, peaceful or kinetic. Military operations should be the last source of power to ever be used. Diplomatic operations, or use of information and economic operations through diplomatic channels should be the tools first chosen to compel the enemy's will. Clausewitz also said that "if such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies."<sup>21</sup>

To understand the influences on the nature of war, one must first look at the continuum of conflict. The earliest theories of organized warfare developed from the

**Chapter II – What is War?**

Greek battles between heavy infantry of the classical period and what could be termed “sport warfare.” One city would form an “army” and proceed to threaten another’s agricultural productivity. Upon recognizing this threat, the offended city would quickly respond “in the form of heavily armed and armored farmers filing into a suitable small plain...where brief but brutal battle resulted either in concessions granted to the army of invasion, or a humiliating, forced retreat back home for the defeated.”<sup>22</sup> This early theory of warfare limited war to a single violent encounter. Even at its genesis, war was far from bloodless.

As warfare progressed technology allowed men to become more efficient in killing each other. Theories of warfare also grew to accommodate man’s willingness to kill each other in ever greater numbers. Giulio Douhet professed, “The prevailing forms of social organization have given war a character of national totality – that is, the entire population and all the resources of a nation are sucked into the maw of war.”<sup>23</sup> Following the carnage of the First World War, Douhet saw no problem, in fact determined that it was necessary, in destroying peacetime industrial and commercial establishments and certain areas of the civilian population using explosive, incendiary, and poison gas bombs “as the situation may require.”<sup>24</sup>

In 1986 the Department of Defense was reorganized as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GWNA). The GWNA was enacted to improve the performance of the Armed Forces by synergizing the effects of Joint operations while reducing the cost of redundant capabilities. The aim was to coordinate the combat capabilities of the Services and allies or coalition partners to achieve the greatest possible military advantage.<sup>25</sup> The

**Chapter II – What is War?**

result was a synchronization all forces to create a significantly greater joint combat power than if each Service had been employed individually against the same enemy.

The law revised and clarified the DoD operational chain of command and JCS functions and responsibilities to provide for a more efficient use of defense resources.<sup>26</sup> It also redefined the roles of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders. The role of the Chairman was elevated to that of principal military advisor to the SECDEF and President, and the Joint Staff was assigned to work for the Chairman. Additionally, the Chairman no longer needed consensus from the Service Chiefs in providing advice to the President. Consequently, the role of the Service Chiefs became more subordinate to that of the Chairman. Also, the Geographic Commanders were given areas of responsibility with a direct link to the President and SECDEF. And finally, through the GWNA Congress mandated that the Services eliminate redundant capabilities and improve at interoperability. The goal here was one, to save money and two, to fully synchronize joint force operations. This would pay dividends after the demise of the Soviet Union when the end to the Cold War resulted in more freedom of action by rogue states and non-state power.

Prior to GWNA, no single individual or agency had overall responsibility for joint doctrine. The GWNA made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff singularly responsible for "developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces." In turn, this 1986 law generated directives that amplified these new joint doctrine responsibilities given to the Chairman.

While the Department of Defense was still grappling with these changes, Operation DESERT STORM proved GWNA had improved the responsiveness of DoD in

**Chapter II – What is War?**

meeting the needs of the SECDEF and President. During the march of US forces into Iraq, the systematic destruction of Saddam Hussein's integrated air defense system underlined this fact most clearly. From the opening shots fired by Army attack helicopters to the close cooperation of Navy, Marine, and Air Force jammers to mislead Iraqi radar operators, the air capabilities of the four services were closely synchronized to achieve synergistic effects. At the same time maneuver forces supported air operations by forcing the Iraqi military to move or be defeated.

In another attempt to achieve greater synergy joint doctrine has introduced “Effects Based Operations” (EBO). EBO was born from the concept of effects based targeting. It is a developing concept that attempts to fully integrate all elements of national power. EBO is defined as using power and influence to create certain desired outcomes at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war. Essentially, EBO focuses on achieving desired effects in order to ultimately attain national objectives. A key factor is that the desired effects are identified first, and then the appropriate instruments, military or otherwise, are applied to achieve the desired effect. Physical destruction, or the use of the military, is not necessary to achieve the national endstate but may still be a desired effect. The primary purpose of kinetic forces is to attempt to break the coherence of the enemy’s war-making and war-fighting capability by taking actions that deny, disrupt, or destroy the his centers of gravity (COGs). According to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, COGs are the enemy’s “characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”<sup>27</sup> Determining how the COGs support the adversary’s war-making capability and how much the adversary’s decision-maker values them are critical considerations for EBO.

**Chapter II – What is War?**

As EBO is further refined one can see a potential trend in the future philosophy or doctrine toward employing all other elements of national power more efficiently to achieve national security and moving away from the inherent violence in war. However, as events in today's Iraq show, bloodless wars to bend the enemy's will seem to still be a long way off.

The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to force old ways of doing business into a new view of future military needs. The April 2003 DoD Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) is essentially focused on "the fight" and better ways to utilize technology to defeat adversaries rather than embracing other sources of power. It is a myopic view of the world through a singularly DoD lens, disregarding the fact that US security depends upon many factors beyond DoD control. According to Col Hammes in *The Sling and the Stone*, DoD has asked, "How do we apply technology to become dominant in future wars' instead of, What will future war look like?" 'How do we recognize it as it develops?' and 'How do we respond to it?'"<sup>28</sup>

The TPG statement, "Today we are witnessing the transition from the industrial age...to the information age" is one example of how DoD is already behind in understanding how the world and future military needs have changed. Friedman argues the information revolution started in the 1990s and has flattened the world to the point where individuals can now act globally.<sup>29</sup> Since we did not get on board by 2000, we are woefully behind. The transition has already begun.

The TPG acknowledges US advantages in conventional combat but does not address how to employ the military when threatened by other means. DoD has simply looked for greater ways to leverage technology and use it more creatively to kinetically

**Chapter II – What is War?**

defeat any adversary who decides to threaten the US in open combat. Col Hammes calls large-scale, force-on-force, combat “third generation warfare,” and argues future warfare will continue in the form of “fourth generation warfare,” where initially weak political movements eventually are able to defeat powerful nations.<sup>30</sup>

Today the United States finds itself in a much more precarious world where rogue states and non-state powers are freer to act out their aggressions as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union. America must find a way to synchronize all sources of power. To do this will involve going beyond singular DoD operations to ones that incorporate and synchronize all elements of national power. However, based upon the current hierarchy DoD is on the same level as the US’s other sources of power and cannot impose this change on other agencies. Real transformation will have to occur across all agencies within the US government. One method of forcing this change might be through enactment of what is commonly called Goldwater-Nichols Two legislation. Forging a defined interagency process or apparatus, streamlining government bureaucracy, developing synergies from each others’ strengths, and eliminating redundancies should be the initial goal. The ultimate goal should be to not use the military source of power if at all possible, but to bloodlessly bend the will of the enemy. It was recognized approximately one thousand eight hundred years ago by Sun Tzu that war was not the panicle of talent. He stated that “...to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, “On War,” Everyman’s Library, p. 83.

<sup>18</sup> Michael E. Brown, ed., “Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” Georgetown University Press, 2003, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Yoram Dinstein, “War, Aggression and Self-Defense,” Cambridge University Press, p.

### Chapter II – What is War?

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<sup>20</sup> Clausewitz, *ibid*.

<sup>21</sup> Clausewitz, p. 105.

<sup>22</sup> Victor D. Hanson, "The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece," Berkley, University of California Press, 1989. p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> Giulio Douhet, "The Command of the Air," translated by Dino Ferrari, Washington D.C. Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998. p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Douhet, p. 20.

<sup>25</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3.0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 10 September 2001

<sup>26</sup> Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Gold Waters Nichols," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993 p 71.

<sup>27</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," p. 80.

<sup>28</sup> Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004. p. 10.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century," New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. p. 10-11.

<sup>30</sup> Hammes, p. 14.

<sup>31</sup> Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, p. 77.

### Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.<sup>32</sup>

George W. Bush, September 17, 2002

The national security strategy (NSS) is the art and science of coordinating the application of national powers (diplomatic, informational, military, economic [DIME]) to maintain the nation's security.<sup>33</sup> Prior to World War II (WW II) the US's security approach was one of isolationism. During WW II, the world saw the destruction of Europe, devastation in the Pacific, atrocities committed by both the Germans and Japanese, and the atomic bomb dropped on two Japanese cities. All of this resulted in the death of millions of people.

Still, after WW II the US believed it could fall back into its old ways of isolationism. Americans believed that with an economy no longer in the grips of a major depression and the strength of a nuclear capable military, a peace dividend was possible. The money the Defense Department used to wage war could be better spent on peaceful endeavors; and, it was. For fear of Europe's and Japan's possible move towards communism, the US was able to rebuild them due to its thriving economy. This economic strength combined with a nuclear capable military shoved the US into the leadership role as the protector of the free world.

#### *A Strategy of Containment*

Two superpowers emerged out of WW II – the US and Soviet Union. Eastern (or Soviet Union) ideology, communism, challenged Western (or US) ideology, democracy. The US had what was initially thought to be a significant edge in military strength because

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

it was the only country with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union quickly closed this gap and detonated its first atomic bomb in August of 1949.<sup>34</sup> With the confidence of a co-superpower, the Soviet Union threatened to overthrow the West by any means possible.

Given the economic and military strengths of the US, this did not seem likely. Then Mao Tze-tung's Chinese communist party overthrew China's western friendly government.

The French found themselves overwhelmed by communist supported forces in Indochina.

In 1950 communist backed North Korea attacked South Korea, also a pro-western country.

The US quickly realized that its nuclear forces could not be used against a non-nuclear capable country. First, the US only had a limited number of warheads. They were reserved for the defense of Europe against an anticipated Soviet attack through the Fulda Gap. Second, the Vietnam and Korean conflicts were not total wars. As a result, it was not viewed as morally right to use such an indiscriminant weapon against noncombatants.

The US's hands seemed cuffed by its own power. Though the US was arguably the most powerful country in the world, it could not use its military power to stop communism from overthrowing governments throughout the world. Once the Soviet Union obtained nuclear weapons, it seemed as if their use and a corresponding retaliation would destroy most of the USSR and the West. It appeared based upon Communist efforts in China, Korea, and Vietnam as though Russia's threat could come true. It seemed as though communism would consume countries one by one, much as one domino causes many others to fall.

This was anticipated by George F. Kennan who in 1947 developed the policy of containment to minimize communist expansionism.<sup>35</sup> This ended up being nearly a 45-year battle. It was fought with coercive diplomacy, shows of force by both sides,

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

surrogate wars, individual acts of military violence (e.g., Gary Powers and the U2 he flew was shot down by the Soviet Union), and economic competition. Even athletic competition pitted the West against the Soviet Union, usually through the summer and winter Olympics.

This national strategy of containment worked against the Soviet Union. The United States after WW II did not withdraw into isolationism as it traditionally had done after previous wars. Nor did it attempt to “roll back” Soviet power, as John Foster Dulles advocated. To a large extent, each succeeding administration after Truman’s adopted a variation of Kennan’s containment policy.<sup>36</sup>

Unbeknownst to the United States at the time, the fall of the Soviet Union did not mean the end of enemies against America’s national interests. What emerged were rogue states, terrorist organizations, Muslim extremists, and non-state powers to challenge the Western way of life. To defeat this challenge the US has to rely on all its sources of power, the expertise it has within other government agencies (OGA) such as the Departments of Treasury, Education, Energy, and Health and Human Services, and friends and coalition forces. Additionally, a wealth expertise in nongovernmental organizations (NGO) can help protect the US’s way of life. Again, the NSS is that tool to focus these sources of power.

***An International Strategy to Unite Actively Against Terrorism***

The national security strategy (NSS) of September 2002 maintained that great struggles against great armies are no longer the greatest threat to the United States.<sup>37</sup> (The NSS published in March of 2006 maintains this emphasis.<sup>38</sup>) In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said, “The great

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

ideological struggles of the 20<sup>th</sup> century between democracy and totalitarianism had ended with a decisive victory for freedom. While there might be differences among them, no great power conflicts loomed on the horizon.<sup>39</sup> The enemies the US faces are terrorists, rogue states, non-state actors, and religious extremists. The national security strategy also states that “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.”<sup>40</sup> It further states that “...the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”<sup>41</sup> Based on the 2002 (and 2006) NSS, the US will take the following actions to protect and secure its national interests:

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity for all people everywhere,
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism,
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts,
4. Prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
5. Support global economic growth,
6. Expand development by opening societies,
7. Work with other centers of global power, and
8. Transform America's national security institutions.<sup>42</sup>
9. The 2006 NSS added: “Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization.”<sup>43</sup>

If the US can accomplish these goals, the President of the United States believes America's way of life and national interests will be secure.

**1. Human Dignity**

Gone are the days when the US could conduct surrogate wars against the Soviet Union in some far off land, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, leaving it in ruin to fend on its own. Gone are the days when the US could topple a Soviet friendly tyrant and replace it with a pro Western tyrant. The US must support broken countries, nations, and even ideologies to prevent the growth of anti US sentiment thus preventing the germination of

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

terrorism. According to the NSS, cultures, nations, and states that embrace human dignity will be freer, more just, and more tolerant. To protect its national interests the US must foster the development of lasting allies by using all sources of national power to work within a foreign culture and imbed the US's ideals "...that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."<sup>44</sup> The 2002 NSS decreed that "America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property."<sup>45</sup>

**2. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism**

The authors of the NSS know that the US cannot stand alone and defeat global terrorism. It must unite with like minded friends and allies to create a synergy of strength to rid the world of this evil. Together with its friends and allies, the priority is to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations with a global reach. The NSS states that the US will use national and international power to conduct direct and continuous action against these terrorists. Additionally, to protect its way of life, the US will identify and destroy the threat before it reaches its borders. Probably most importantly, the United States Government (USG) will work with friends and allies so that terrorism is viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide. If this gains acceptance the international community will work together against terrorism. Additionally, the global war on terrorism is a fight for democratic values and way of life. Consequently, the US will not discern a difference between a terrorist and one who aids terrorists. The two are one in the same. The US and those who support America will deal with both in the same manner.<sup>46</sup> The

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

future of the global war on terrorism is dependent on coalition support and the effort they will bring to the “fight.”

**3. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts**

The US must concentrate efforts to defuse regional conflicts if it is to protect its own interests. By doing so, it will avoid “explosive escalations and minimize human suffering,”<sup>47</sup> both of which can strain relations the US has with regional and global allies. Regional conflicts can “rekindle rivalries and create horrifying affronts to human dignity.”<sup>48</sup> As stated earlier, a key element to protecting the American way of life is the protection of human dignity. By eliminating regional conflicts and fostering tolerance and respect for fellow man, the US will go a long way in preventing atrocities which give cause for terrorism.<sup>49</sup>

**4. Prevent the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**

Rogue states, undeterables, terrorist organization, Muslim extremists, and non-state powers who hate the West and everything it stands for would love to obtain WMD. Their efforts on 9/11 demonstrate they will use WMD if and when they obtain this capability. These groups have a smaller stake in global stability. They lack traditional instruments of state power and therefore seek unconventional weapons such as WMD to compensate. Due to the fact that they are weaker in terms of military or economic might, they are less susceptible to traditional deterrence methods, which in turn support their efforts to develop unconventional arsenals.<sup>50</sup> Though they will not have the destructive power the US and Soviet Union had during the times of mutually assured destruction, given the actions they have taken against their own people and their support for global terrorism, tens of thousands of people could die if any type of WMD is acquired.

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

Consequently, the US must be prepared to stop these “rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction...”<sup>51</sup> through proactive counter-proliferation efforts, strengthened nonproliferation efforts, and effective consequence management. The US cannot afford to react after the fact. WMD are too great a threat to wait for their use and then react. The US must take preemptive action to counter a WMD threat. It must do so by building better intelligence capabilities, coordinating closely with allies and transforming the military to ensure rapid, precise, and decisive results.<sup>52</sup>

**5. Support Global Economic Growth**

An economy based on free trade and an unencumbered market is “the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.”<sup>53</sup> Increasing prosperity and reducing poverty increases self-esteem, improves the economy, supports legal reform, and discourages corruption. According to this NSS, the US plans to economically engage with other countries to demonstrate how these policies support higher productivity and economic growth. The premise is that though each country is responsible for its own economy, if it would adopt policies similar to that of the US its economy would grow and benefit all citizens. As a result, terror, corruption, and lawlessness would be minimized and ultimately promote global security. Obvious examples of this are the economic reconstruction of Japan and western European countries after World War II.<sup>54</sup> Both are now world economic leaders.

**6. Expand Development by Opening Societies**

According to the 2002 NSS, half of the people in the world live on less than \$2 a day.<sup>55</sup> US aid has at times supported governments that worked counter to those they

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

governed. As a result, much economic support never reached those in need. The US as a part of its national security strategy will work with governments willing to develop policies and procedures that permit and support the economic/entrepreneurial potential of all individuals. This effort nests with number one, Human Dignity and five, Global Economic Growth. Combined they increase prosperity and reduce poverty which, as stated earlier, increases self-esteem, improves the economy, supports legal reform, and discourages corruption. To deliver this, the USG will:

- Provide resource to aid countries that have met the challenge of national reform to fight corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and enable entrepreneurship.
- Improve the effectiveness of the World Bank and other development banks in raising living standards.
- Insist upon measurable results to ensure that development assistance is actually make a difference in the lives of the world's poor.
- Increase the amount of development assistance that is provided in the form of grants instead of loans. The USG intends to implement the using results-based grants or economics.
- Open societies to commerce and investment. Trade and investment are the real engines of economic growth.
- Secure public health.
- Emphasize education.
- Continue to aid agricultural development.<sup>56</sup>

**7. Work with Other Centers of Global Power**

As stated in number 2 above, the US cannot go it alone. It does not have the money, the forces, or at times the staying power. Together with coalitions, free nations throughout the world can benefit from this same strategy. The US will do all it can to strengthen its relationship with its close allies such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Europe. Additionally, this NSS calls for cooperative trading and defense institutions such as NATO and ASEAN to strengthen themselves so as to play a larger role

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

in self- and collective- defense. Finally, the US will cultivate its relationships with potential great powers such as Russia, China, and India to benefit in trade, security cooperation, and other overlapping interests such as this war on terrorism. The US knows that its security is strengthened through coalitions of the willing. It also knows that it “must develop active agendas of cooperation lest these relationships become routine and unproductive.”<sup>57</sup>

**8. Transform America's National Security Institutions**

The world has changed since the fall of the Soviet bloc. If the US continues to prepare for the last war, it will not be prepared for the next. It must transform to meet the current threat. In particular, the US military must transform so that it can “...defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure US access to distant theaters, and protect critical US infrastructure and assets in outer space.”<sup>58</sup> The military must be able to discourage aggression against the US and its allies and friends. The first line of defense against terrorists is intelligence. The intelligence community (IC) must transform and develop policies to integrate with allies, the DoD, and the law enforcement systems to stay ahead of the terrorism. Additionally, the Department of State (DoS) must be strengthened to focus diplomatic power against all enemies of the US. An effective diplomatic effort of international cooperation must be accomplished to meet the goals of this NSS. Finally, combined and nested diplomatic, informational, military, and economic operations will synergize these national powers which will ensure an effective interagency effort to secure America and its friends and allies.

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests*****Conclusion***

The enemy has changed. The US now faces adversaries such as terrorists, rogue states, undeterables, non-state actors, and religious extremists. The NSS works to unite and transform not just the military, but also all elements of national power to focus against the current threat. In an effort to apply America's national sources of power the NSS calls for efforts to shape the environment to prevent emerging threats. It does this by emphasizing the protection of human dignity, strengthening alliances, defusing regional conflicts, preventing the use of WMD, supporting global economic growth, opening societies, and working with other centers of global power. Finally, the NSS calls for the transformation of America's national security institutions such as the IC, DoD, and DoS. The military source of national power needs to be deemphasized to allow diplomatic, informational, and economic sources of power to be more effective. The US cannot afford to wait until things go bad before using all of its powers in a synergistic way to protect its security. Given today's undeterables, it must use all means possible to avoid being attacked. It is more cost effective to prevent a war than it is to carry it out and then rebuild. To do all of this, the diplomatic, informational, and economic sources of power must be empowered to work alongside as an equal partner with the military.

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<sup>32</sup> The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” 10 July 2001, p. I-2.

<sup>34</sup> CNN Perspective Series, “The Cold War,” available from <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/12/>, accessed 8 Nov 05.

<sup>35</sup> Department of State, “Kennan and Containment,” available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/time/cwr/17601.htm>, accessed 27 October 2005.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002.

<sup>38</sup> The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” March 2006.

**Chapter III – A Strategy to Secure America's National Interests**

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<sup>39</sup> Stephen Hadley, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley to the Council on Foreign Relations," October 2005, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051018-6.html>, accessed 27 October 2005.

<sup>40</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," March 2006

<sup>44</sup> US Declaration of Independence, July 2, 1776.

<sup>45</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Michael E. Brown, ed., "Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," Georgetown University Press, 2003, p. 41.

<sup>51</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America."

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.<sup>59</sup>

Carl von Clausewitz

The ability of the United States to influence events to its advantage worldwide depends in large measure on the will of its citizenry, the vitality of its societal institutions, the strength of its relations with like-minded multinational partners, and the effectiveness of the Government in employing the instruments of national power.<sup>60</sup>

Joint Publication 1

***Introduction***

In the quote above Clausewitz identifies a nation's tools to persuade another.

These tools are commonly referred to today as a nation's sources of power. He states that war is a paradoxical trinity and the first of these – violence, hatred, and enmity – concerns itself with the people of a nation. The second – chance and probability – is the domain of the commander and his army or the military. The third – subordination as a policy – is developed and pursued by the government.<sup>61</sup> This has been viewed as a three-legged stool. The stool is war. The legs of the stool are the people, the military, and the government. If any one of these is excluded in a strategy, the stool cannot stand, and therefore, war would be lost. Clausewitz states, "A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."<sup>62</sup> This three-legged stool of war could also be viewed as a three-legged stool of peace.

In an effort to impose one nation's will over another, all sources of power must be maximized in order to achieve the desired ends, which is national security. In the past, a nation's powers have been identified as residing in diplomacy, informational, military, and

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

economic,<sup>63</sup> commonly referred to as DIME. When properly synchronized, DIME will utilize all other sources of power the nation has (see Figure IV-1). Most recently, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism added law enforcement, finance, and intelligence as sources of national power.<sup>64</sup> The one source of national power that always seems to be overlooked is a nation's will or the will of the people. Clausewitz saw these two hundred years ago. Wars have been lost because the people's will has been overlooked. Yet, national strategies often do not address this vital source of power. Another source of power a nation wields is its culture. Culture, as a tool, is intangible. However, once a nation or state assumes a culture similar to that of another, the two become more alike and often interdependent. As a result, their differences would be minimal and war would generally be counterproductive.

***Economic***

By far, the most important and most influential source of power is economic. A state's economic capability is directly related to its ability to produce – for example, a profit, an infrastructure, or a military. A state's goals, to include security, are largely met based upon its economic capability. Armies are built, alliances are developed, and cooperation is facilitated based upon the ability of a state convert its resources to needed goods and services, for example oil to energy, fertile ground to crops, and armies to defense. States that lack resources or the ability to convert them often do one of two things – cooperate with other nations or go to war to obtain them.




Figure IV-1, Illustration taken from Joint Publication 1.<sup>65</sup>

It is, ultimately, access to the world's scarce resources and the ability to obtain them – food, energy, and minerals – that determines a state's economic strength. Nations and states have gone to war to increase their economic base. Germany and Japan attacked nations during World War II to obtain vital resources. In 1990, Iraq, through the use of force, annexed Kuwait and gained control of its oil. The United States feared that Iraq, with its fourth largest military in the world, would expand beyond Kuwait and, as a result, control much of the oil in the Middle East. As a result, the US initiated Operation Desert Storm and, with over 500,000 forces, defeated Iraq's army, pushing it out of Kuwait back into Iraq.<sup>66</sup> It is also economic strength, or lack thereof, that often determines a state's

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

ability to defend its interests either through direct economic actions or the augmentation of another national power.

A state's direct economic capability as an instrument of national power can be utilized as either a carrot or a stick. In either case it is crucial to the force planner and strategist to incorporate this source of power within security strategies and campaign plans. In doing so, a state can sway a potential adversary or gain access to scarce resources through aid, trade, or investment. For example, according to the September 2002 NSS, the United States, in an effort to secure its national interests, intends to "ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade."<sup>67</sup> To do so, the US will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond its shores by supporting nations that promote policies which generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth.<sup>68</sup> According to the 2006 NSS "greater economic freedom also leads to greater economic opportunity and prosperity for everyone."<sup>69</sup>

The economic instrument of national power can be coercive as well in the form of economic sanctions. It may include a freeze on assets and finances, intervention in exchange rate markets, and withdrawing most-favored nation (MFN) trade status. During the Cold War, economic sanctions were used "to deny resources to the communist world, e.g. strict limits on loans to the USSR, and in part to punish allies, e.g. financial leverage over Great Britain and France to force an end to their invasion of Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956."<sup>70</sup> The US has frozen al Qaeda monies within US banks as a result of 9/11 and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism.

There are, however, several issues that make the use of economic sanctions more difficult. For one, it is dealt out based on the needs of the sanctioning state and not

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

necessarily based on an infraction. For example, the US withheld MFN status from the Soviet Union and enforced strict controls on exports with the potential for military use. On the other hand, it did not impose any sanctions on Japan for unfair trade policies.<sup>71</sup> This sends mixed signals to other states indicating that some nations can get away with infractions while others may not. What might follow is friction between states. Another issue with economic sanctions is that they are not easily imposed because they often require the support of other nations to be effective. For instance, if the US imposes sanctions on a country stipulating that it cannot sell oil for cash, then the rest of the world needs to impose the same sanction or it will mean nothing. A third difficulty with imposing sanctions is that it takes a long time to accomplish a goal strictly through the use of the economic source of power. Fourth, a major concern with these sanctions is the issue of morality. Opponents of economic sanctions assert that they “have little impact on the government whose behavior we are attempting to influence, but a great deal on the target state’s population, especially the weakest.”<sup>72</sup> For example, UNICEF reports that the economic sanctions place on Iraq after Desert Storm resulted in 90,000 deaths each year it was imposed.<sup>73</sup> Though economic sanctions can support the attainment of national security objectives, they are not a panacea. Sanctions were imposed on Iraq but Saddam Hussein was not daunted. The US eventually used force to remove him from power.

Still another perceived issue is that sanctions hurt the sanctioning and supporting states’ economy as well, especially in today’s globalized market. A state that cannot trade loses access to outside services and scarce resources. Corporations and markets, as a result of globalization, are becoming intertwined. The international economy and the political environment it supports are becoming mutually dependent. Globalization is the

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

“process of creating worldwide, interdependent markets operating with little regard for state boundaries or the traditional understanding of sovereignty.”<sup>74</sup> There is no such thing as a purely domestic economy today.

There are several reasons why globalization has created interdependent markets.

The first of these is states have significantly increased their international trade. As a result they “feel the effect of the international system much more heavily than they did forty years ago.”<sup>75</sup> A trading partner whose economy has moved in a large way up or down can significantly impact the global market, especially if its trade is in scarce resources such as oil.

Another cause of interdependency is that there is an increase in capital flow. The financial systems today, due to the fact that money can be transferred instantaneously with the stroke of a computer key, often hinge on the stability of another state’s system. The larger economies will have a greater impact on smaller ones as markets fluctuate up or down. For example, if the US’s economy falls, the world could be pushed into a depression. If Indonesia’s economy collapses, then a company like the Nike Corporation may have to move money to India to increase shoe production that Indonesia can no longer sustain. The result is a large amount of capital withdrawn from or infused into a country can either strengthen or weaken its economy in a short period of time.

A third reason globalization has increased interdependency deals with economic production. No longer is an entire product researched, engineered, developed, produced, and assembled in one country. International trade today is “not merely the exchange of one nation’s products for another’s but the exchange of products representing work done in ten, twenty or even thirty countries.”<sup>76</sup> A car cannot be looked at as German, British, or

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

American. In fact, parts are produced in dozens of countries and assembled under one company name, which may or may not be where it is headquartered.

A final reason for interdependency is in the area of policies and procedures. States are beginning to bind together to determine how intellectual property, patent laws, or environmental norms will be enforced.<sup>77</sup> The World Trade Organization, with 135 countries, oversees international trade rules and regulations. These countries will determine “which rules are fair game, which ones are not, even how sanitary standards can be applied.”<sup>78</sup>

Economies today are more interdependent than they have ever been. However, even though markets can operate regardless of sovereignty, this interdependent international economy has also resulted in states being more influenced by use of the economic source of power. Sanctions imposed can collapse a state’s economy. Aid given can sustain a state’s economy, and thus its national interests. Therefore, as stated earlier, it is crucial to the force planner and strategist to incorporate this source of power within security strategies and campaign plans.

***Diplomacy***

When nations relate with other nations there is give and take. The greater a need the greater one gives or takes. This can often lead to antagonistic, short- or long-term, situations. It is the diplomat who attempts to mitigate antagonism and still bend the other nation’s will to meet his nation’s needs.

There are several views as to what is meant by diplomacy. One perspective is that it is the “peaceful conduct of relations among political entities.”<sup>79</sup> Where this falls short, particularly today, is that diplomacy is not only conducted between political entities.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

Instant global communications have given non-political entities the ability to interact with the people of other nations as well as other nation's organizations. Examples of these are groups such as Doctors Without Borders, the International Red Cross, and Greenpeace, not to mention organizations that promote terrorism. Diplomacy today is not just relationships between governments and government agencies. A better definition of diplomacy would be "all those elements of national power which peaceably advance and defend one's national interests."<sup>80</sup> Additionally, diplomacy does not just include diplomatic professionals, but also all the other governmental, non-governmental, and private officials.<sup>81</sup>

Prior to global communications, international relations were conducted fairly autonomously through formal diplomatic missions using high levels of diplomatic protocol, secrecy, and honesty.<sup>82</sup> After World War I, there was a general mistrust of secret, governmental relations. With the help of global communications, diplomacy began to open up and become more responsive to public opinion. As a result of further globalization via the radio, press, television, satellite communications, and the internet, diplomacy broadened beyond government-to-government discussions to include, as a minimum, government-to-public; military- or soldier-to-government and -public; cultural-to-cultural; and non-government agencies to governments, organizations, and people.

Government-to-public is an effort at winning the hearts and minds of the people of a nation, state, or non-state entity through non-coercive methods. This will hopefully prevent the requirement for military action. Or, if military action must take place, the road to stability will be much shorter if public diplomacy is effectively used. It is this difficult task that all diplomats, governmental or otherwise, should strive to achieve at all costs.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

For one, it is more cost effective to persuade than to destroy and rebuild. If non-coercive methods fail, lives lost can never be recovered. Finally, if this effort fails, years and often centuries can be filled with conquest, violence, destruction, terrorism, and an untold loss of life as has been witnessed to this day between democratic and communist nations, Protestants and Catholics, Jews and Muslims, and Christians and Muslims. Public diplomacy, or communicating directly with a foreign nation's public, is a key government-to-public mission that will peacefully bend others to American's will. This should be an ongoing mission, prior, during, and after any coercive activity.

Another form of diplomacy outside of the professional diplomat arena, is military-to-government. There are military attachés assigned to embassies assisting foreign nations and armies to understand the US military. Additionally, DoD is providing military assistance with training, military sales, and, of course, traditional military operations such as self defense, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. Also outside of the State Department are federal agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>83</sup> These and more offer a valuable service in acting on behalf of America's national interests. All told, there are many more Americans in contact with foreign governments and foreign nationals than there are members of the State Department.<sup>84</sup>

Peace and war are linked together – without one, you have the other. Clausewitz stated that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”<sup>85</sup> When states are not involved in a kinetic war preventive diplomacy is conducted to peacefully compel non-cooperative nations to do what they otherwise would not. Then, based on these views, when kinetic war breaks out, coercive diplomacy forces a state to do another's will.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

Kinetic war in the United States is managed by the Department of Defense. Peace is managed by the Department of State (DoS).

It is far more costly to conduct a war and rebuild a state than it is to prevent war.

Shaping, persuading, or bending a nation's will to secure national interests is the essential task of the Department of State. Therefore, DoS must be intimately involved in, if not lead, all campaign planning. The Department of State must conduct campaign planning to such a degree that the agency accepts it as its own. DoS must take the lead during time of peace, unstable or otherwise. For that reason, the Department of State must be the supported agency and the Department of Defense the supporting agency during times of peace and conflict resolution. Likewise, the nation's campaigns must not be just campaigns of war, but also campaigns of peace.

***Information***

Information is defined as knowledge, data, or facts.<sup>86</sup> And, as the old saying goes...knowledge is power. To plan or conduct any operation involving two or more parties, information is needed by all parties. To plan or conduct operations in a complex environment such as a major military campaign, information is crucial. Sun Tzu said, "Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement."<sup>87</sup>

At the national strategic level information is crucial in developing and maintaining friends, allies, coalitions and national and international support. It is the President of the United States who is responsible for this process. He can, and often does, act on his own

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

through speeches, directives, releases, or any other means of communication to control what information is presented or withheld from friends, allies, partners and the public. He can also manage information through the national sources of power. On 5 February 2003, Colin Powell as Secretary of State gave an information brief to a session of the United Nations on WMD in Iraq. President Bush used the information that Powell presented to help sway national and international support prior to his March 2003 attack into Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. Another example of how information affects national will, which in turn may adversely impact campaigns, is the current insurgency in Iraq and its operations against US service members. Iraqi insurgents are using homemade improved explosive devices (IEDs) to attack coalition forces. Deaths as a result of these IEDs have little impact on military operations; however, they have a huge impact on global perception. As a result, the American populace might not have the will to continue until its interests are met. National politics would force the President to withdraw. The insurgency may then overthrow the elected Iraqi government and win the war.

During war, information management or IO (information Operation) at the operational level and below is just as crucial. IO's primary purpose involves the "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."<sup>88</sup> The goal is to achieve and sustain information superiority over the enemy. Information superiority means to be able to "collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."<sup>89</sup> In the military everybody, individually and collectively, is responsible for IO. According to JP 3-13, IO must merge the following, traditionally separated capabilities to be effective:

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

- Information Security
- Public Affairs
- Counter Deception
- Physical Security
- Communications Security
- Deception
- Computer Security
- Physical Attack
- Counterintelligence
- Counter-propaganda
- Network Management
- Electronic Warfare
- Operations Security
- Computer Network Attack
- Civil Affairs
- Others as needed

This truly impacts the entire civil/military command and staff. IO targets include, but are not limited to civilian, military, social, and cultural leadership; civil infrastructure; military infrastructure; and weapons systems. Key to information operations is what should or can be presented. The United States and its western friends and allies operate within a specified set of rules. Within these rules it is expected that they tell the truth, if necessary, to the detriment of operations, rather than to lie about a topic to gain an advantage or even to protect forces. Often times the enemy, especially insurgents and terrorists do not have to abide by these same rules. As a result, the enemy can present untruths via the media, word of mouth through the internet and email, and through general operations that can significantly impact operations from the tactical level of war to the national strategic level. In order to win the information battle these perceptions need to be nullified by well planned and executed information operations by commanders at all levels, focused on defeating the enemy's centers of gravity and protecting friendly centers of gravity.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

This is not to say that deception or propaganda is not permitted. Deception is defined by JP 1-02 as “those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.”<sup>90</sup> Propaganda is “any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”<sup>91</sup> These types of operations should be thoroughly planned, wargamed, and executed. However, should the US or its partners be caught conducting these types of operations, the media as shown that it will use it against them. The use of deception, propaganda, or untruths needs to be justified and incorporated within operations in order to mitigate media manipulation.

The protection of friendly information, the exploitation of enemy information, and the guiding of national and international perceptions, when properly used, is a very important source of power. The lack of a well conceived and implemented information campaign plan can lose wars and negatively impact national security. A good information campaign plan can significantly increase the chances of winning wars and protecting national security (see Figure IV-2).

## Chapter IV – National Powers

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

During the Persian Gulf War, defensive information operations ensured that the Coalition soundly defeated Saddam Hussein's political strategy, which was aimed at influencing the decision making coalition nation leadership. Immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq began campaigning for public support. This effort included defaming Kuwait's ruling family and portraying Iraq as the champion of anti-colonialism, social justice, Arab unity, the Palestinian cause, and Islam. In an apparent move to defuse initial international condemnation of its invasion of Kuwait, Saddam falsely announced Iraqi troops would begin pulling out of Kuwait on 6 August 1990. In spite of Hussein's efforts to influence Coalition actions, the Coalition's information strategy ensured that the war was fought under favorable conditions that took full advantage of Coalition strengths and Iraqi weaknesses, ensuring Saddam's political and military strategy was soundly defeated. Despite Hussein's attempts to intimidate his neighbors, the Gulf States requested outside help and a Coalition formed. The Arab "street" did not rise up on his behalf, and Israeli restraint in the face of Scud attacks undermined his plan to turn the war into an Arab-Israeli conflict. Coalition leadership aggressively countered Saddam's widely publicized threats of massive casualties and his taking of hostages, neither of which deterred Coalition resolve. Saddam's attempts to take the offense by his use of Scuds and the attack on the Saudi town of Al-Khafji failed to achieve their strategic purpose of reducing the Coalition's will to fight. On all information fronts, the effective use of information operations by the Coalition to defend against Saddam's information strategy ensured that Iraq was not only beaten, but also failed to ever seize the initiative.

SOURCE: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress, April 1992

Figure IV-2, Illustration from Joint Publication 3-13.<sup>92</sup>

If a state acts independently, regardless of who it affects that nation will most likely have little international support in its endeavors. Perception is reality and reality is based upon information obtained on a particular subject.

***Military***

The main purpose of the military is to fight and win any war the state requires of it. The US Department of Defense through the National Military Strategy (NMS) gives strategic direction to the military. It identifies the overarching military objectives which in turn determine capabilities needed to achieve the objectives. In other words, the NMS in a broad way identifies the requirements needed to achieve the ways and means to protect the US. It is guided by the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and it implements the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy (NDS).

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

During the Cold War the pervasive threat against the United States was the Soviet Union. It was envisioned that war with the Soviet Union would be fought force-on-force in a high intensity environment with a good probability that nuclear weapons would be used. This war would have most likely taken place in Western Europe. However, it did not happen and the Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time a wider range of adversaries has emerged. According to the NMS, the current types of threats the US may face are:

- Traditional. These are threats posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
- Irregular. Threats from those employing “unconventional” methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents.
- Catastrophic. Threats involving the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects (referred to as WMD/E).
- Disruptive. Threats coming from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current US advantages in key operational domains.<sup>93</sup>

Campaign plans are developed by combatant commanders (COCOM) and are designed to protect the US against aggression, prevent conflicts or surprise attacks, and prevail against any of these threats. Campaigns are undertaken to swiftly defeat adversaries and prevent them from achieving their objectives by altering “behavior or policies, swiftly denying an adversary’s operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or uncontrolled conflict escalation, and/or rapidly re-establishing security conditions favorable to the United States”<sup>94</sup>

According to the NMS, the COCOM must take into account several considerations when these campaign plans are developed. One is that the military objectives within each level of operation must be interrelated and included in planning across the spectrum of

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

warfare – strategic, operational, and tactical. A second consideration is that the COCOM must develop plans to achieve the objectives simultaneously. Lastly, the COCOM must *not* assume that a well developed defense will deter all threats and achieve the national objectives. This requires the COCOM to have “a posture of anticipatory self-defense, which reflects the need for prepared and proportional responses to imminent aggression.”<sup>95</sup> The COCOM must be prepared to “preempt in self-defense an adversary who poses an unmistakable threat of grave harm”<sup>96</sup> The objectives of the US military, as delineated by the NMS, are to protect the US against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise attacks, and prevail against any adversary.<sup>97</sup>

A campaign plan is a six-phased process. Many of these phases may be conducted concurrently. The six phases of a campaign plan are as follows:

- Phase 0 – Shape, prevent, prepare
- Phase I – Deter – tension
- Phase II – Seize Initiative – polarization, crisis
- Phase III – Dominate – conflict
- Phase IV – Stabilize – transition
- Phase V – Enable Civil Authority<sup>98</sup>

The military should not be the sole source of power to achieve any one or all of these phases. All of America’s sources of power would work better as a team and therefore should be utilized to the fullest to protect the US against aggression, prevent conflicts or surprise attacks, and prevail against any aggressor. Other sources of power should lead a particular phase while the military conducts a supporting role. Additionally, Phase 0 should be a continuous effort, conducted regardless of which other phases have been implemented or are ongoing.

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**Chapter IV – National Powers**

In the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, additional sources of national power are law enforcement, financial, and intelligence.<sup>99</sup>

***Law Enforcement***

Terrorism has become a primary threat against the security of the US. Add to this transnational crime such as narcotics, money laundering, economic espionage, and the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. As such, the lines between criminal behavior and terrorism and the lines between domestic and international threats are blurring.

Within the US law enforcement is the frontline of defense. Officers “walk the beat” twenty-four hours a day; seven days a week. Consequently, they are a key source of power in the protection of national security. Though, historically, it has been investigative and prosecutorial in nature, law enforcement agencies are moving towards prevention. Initiatives such as the Counterterrorist Center (1986), National Drug Intelligence Center (1992), PDD 62 (Protection Against Unconventional Threats), PDD 63 (Critical Infrastructure Protection), and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which unite the FBI with the CIA and local police, have been attempts to refocus domestic law enforcement towards “interagency” coordination in the gathering of information to preserve national security.<sup>100</sup>

Additionally, today, there are a lot of similarities between law enforcement operations and military operations. Terrorists “networks” have often times been likened to intercity gangs and the warfare conducted by police to counter these gangs. Their targets – the legitimate authority of a society – and operations against those targets are similar to those used by terrorists. In light of this correlation, strategists who plan to defeat terrorists can gain useful insight from law enforcement agencies. In other words, US domestic experiences can enlighten and provide support towards the achievement of international

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

operations. For example, the FBI's Waco, Texas incident has several parallel similarities.

FBI Special Agent Coleen Rowley gave the following comparison between the Branch

Davidian operation and Operation Iraqi Freedom:

- Koresh had the same kind of oppressive control over members of his Branch Davidian followers as Saddam Hussein does over the Iraqis.
- As with Hussein, law enforcement officials were certain Koresh had accumulated a formidable arsenal of weapons and ammunition.
- As Bush believed Hussein would use WMD, the FBI believed Koresh would use his arsenal of weapons.
- The first law enforcement assault on Koresh failed.
- Koresh and his followers were put under siege similar to Operation Southern Watch put Hussein under siege.
- The FBI decided it could wait no longer and mounted a second assault without the element of surprise. President George W. Bush attacked Hussein for the second time in 2003.
- The assault failed when Koresh and his followers set themselves on fire. Time will tell if the removal of Hussein will succeed or fail.<sup>101</sup>

Key to all of this is that law enforcement has been set up to protect the freedoms

Americans have determined to be the rights of all mankind. Unfortunately, these freedoms

are impediments in preventing terrorist acts. Brent Scowcroft, former National Security

Adviser, once said, “The safest place in the world for a terrorist to be is inside the United

States...As long as [terrorists] don’t do something that trips them up against our laws, they

can do pretty much all they want.”<sup>102</sup> The President, Congress, Supreme Court, and,

ultimately, the people of the United States will have to make hard decisions in determining

how much, if any, erosion of these freedoms is necessary to protect the safety of

America’s citizens. There is a fine line between protecting freedoms and not having any.

Law enforcement needs support national security without the US losing its identity as the

strongest and freest nation in the world.

**Chapter IV – National Powers*****Financial***

Finance by definition means (1) “control of the money” and (2) “the money necessary to do something, especially a project.”<sup>103</sup> As a source of power financial processes fund the United States with the money to purchase all that it needs, from governing to peaceful endeavors to war making. It also allows nongovernmental organizations to exert the influence they want to apply to foreign countries, foreign organizations, and domestic governments and organizations. Without finance nothing happens.

Also, the more money a government has, the more it can directly influence foreign governments. During the past fifty years the US has spent trillions of dollars on foreign aid alone.<sup>104</sup> Whether this is considered purchasing friends or not it is a bloodless way of influencing, and possibly bending another’s will.

Additionally, there is a cycle that finance contributes to. It gives individuals the ability to purchase goods and services they otherwise would not be able to if they could only buy with money on hand. This fuels the economy by creating a greater demand. Greater demands increase production and service. The increase in production and service creates a requirement for more jobs. This creates more people with the finances to purchase more goods and services. Ultimately, this procedure of financing for goods and services increase the wealth of the nation.

The more people, companies, and the government spend the stronger the economy becomes. A strong economy allows the government to purchase a mightier army, a greater diplomatic force, and more information gathering tools. Indeed, the more money a government has the greater it can add to its arsenal of sources of power.

**Chapter IV – National Powers*****Intelligence***

Ideally, intelligence obtains timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized actionable information. The customers of intelligence include the President, NSC, Cabinet officials, Congress, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and other governmental agencies. During a kinetic war, intelligence operations support the winning of battles and campaigns. During other operations it supports the promotion of peace, the resolution of conflict, and the deterrence of war.

Intelligence identifies gaps in available information about the environment and the opposing forces, government, or industry and uses intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IRS) resources to fill those gaps and reduce uncertainty and risk to US decision makers. Intelligence reduces uncertainty, but it cannot eliminate it entirely.

Additionally, the Intelligence Community (IC) has finite resources and capabilities. Consequently, in the probable event that the IC cannot obtain the exact information needed, it looks for indications and warnings that are unique to the type of information needed. For example, if the President needs to know if Iran is producing nuclear weapons, the IC may not be able to obtain a nuclear warhead with made in Iran on it. The IC would then look for nuclear weapons grade materials needed to develop the weapon that is being bought by and sold and shipped to Iran. The transfer of funds, selling, and the shipment of weapons grade material are all indicators that Iran may be producing nuclear weapons. With this information in hand, the President can then apply national sources of power against Iran to conform to his will.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

The intelligence community refers to agencies and organizations that are funded within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). It consists of following 15 organizations:

- National Foreign Intelligence Community:
  - CIA
  - Department of Energy
  - Department of Homeland Security
  - Department of Justice
  - Department of State
  - Department of Treasury
  - Department of Defense
- Defense Intelligence:
  - DIA
  - NGA
  - NRO
  - NSA
  - Marine Corps
  - AF
  - Army
  - Navy<sup>105</sup>

As a source of power, intelligence presents information that either indicates or identifies that the nation's security is at risk. The decision makers need to determine whether or not to act upon the obtained information. If so, with what powers (diplomatically, militarily, economically, etc.) and when and where will action be taken. Intelligence is the driving force behind campaigns. Without it justification for action is limited. Frederick the Great said, "One should know one's enemies, their alliances, their resources and nature of their country, in order to plan a campaign."<sup>106</sup>

***Will of the People***

Clausewitz introduced his theory of the paradoxical trinity of violence, hatred, and enmity in his book "On War." Violence referred to the people of a nation or state. Inherent in the people must be the passion for war or, like a missing leg of a three-legged

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

stool, the nation at war will fall. Clausewitz further states that when developing war plans this paradoxical trinity must be taken into account – the armed forces, the country, and the enemy's will. Of these, the armed forces may be destroyed and the country occupied however, war cannot be “considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken.”<sup>107</sup> The most obvious example that the US faced was the Vietnam War. The US won every battle, but lost the war because they could not break the will of the North Vietnamese. Additionally, the North Vietnamese were able to defeat the will of the US government and its people. American left Vietnam in disgrace. Another pointed example is the war between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union lost this war due in large part to being unable to defeat (with US support) the enemy's will to fight. The Soviet Union and the US were two superpowers that lost to third-world countries.

To subjugate the American military even more so than in many other countries, “the Armed Forces of the United States operate in a democratic political context that enables the American people to express their views and preferences about the employment of military forces.”<sup>108</sup> The views (or will) of the people of the United States determine the use of the military instrument of power. Therefore, Clausewitz's point on the passion of the people for war weighs heavier in the US than in countries whose armies rule their people. Regardless, the will of the people may be the strongest defensive source of power another nation may face in attempting to impose its desires over another.

***Culture***

Probably the most powerful offensive source of power takes the form of culture-to-culture. US culture is reaching out to all corners of the globe via tourism, corporate expansion, and global communications. This form of national power, coined by Joseph

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

Nye as soft power, is getting people to want what another culture has.<sup>109</sup> Experts believe this is the most important asset to sustain American power throughout the world.<sup>110</sup> This form of diplomacy co-opts rather than coerces and requires no speeches, treaties, compromises, or monetary gifts. Culture-to-culture diplomacy presents the American way of life which is freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic prosperity and allows its obvious appeal to speak for itself.<sup>111</sup> Once a country, nation, or group of people (rogue or otherwise) has accepted the American culture, it has, for the most part, accepted the American way of life.

The American way of life centers on that of achieving one's goals. It is uniquely suited for growth, advancement, and innovation through its entrepreneurial spirit. As a universal nation it is generally made up of socially mobile, ethnically mixed, racially tolerant people who are not averse to taking risks. Intel was invented by a Hungarian, Google by a Russian, and Yahoo by a Taiwanese.<sup>112</sup> Additionally, tolerance and risk allows for acceptance of new, different, and controversial ideas. It embraces the good that immigrants bring from other cultures, making them part of America's culture. As a result of this unencumbered, unfettered, and unregulated exchange of ideas, the US becomes, not just a melting pot of people, but a melting pot of great cuisine, music, art, science, and technology envied by the rest of the world. Fostering this is a government that is by the people, for the people which has evolved to be one of the most laissez-faire governments in the world. It has an extreme tolerance for creative destruction where industries competing with each other will fall if they fail to meet the needs of the people. This permits evolutionary and revolutionary ideas rise to the top and fill a need. Cultures that

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

are less tolerant and more regulated due to socialism, religion, etc., stifle innovation and creativity.

According to the US Census Bureau, from 1980 to 2000 approximately one million people a year legally immigrated to the United States.<sup>113</sup> This is not due to intolerance, indignities, repression, and injustice. Immigrants see US culture and want to make it theirs. In the United States, they see a way to achieve their dreams. As other governments embrace American ideals and culture and adopt them as their own, intolerance and war will be minimized.

***Conclusion***

America's national powers are plentiful. They include the traditional diplomatic, informational, military, and economic sources, otherwise known as DIME. However, as addressed above, sources of power lie elsewhere as well, in nontraditional sources such as law enforcement. The war on terrorism has caused law enforcement to become more and more relied upon as the lines between criminal activities and war blend together. Finance provides the money for a stronger government and nongovernmental organizations. Finally, the cultural source of power is the most influential of them all. If a nation or state adopts a similar culture to that of the United States, that is self-governing with a market economy, wars will be fought via trade rather than with armies. Until this happens, though, the US must focus and synchronize all of its sources of power to achieve the same objective – protecting the security its people and their way of life.

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<sup>59</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, “On War,” 1976, p. 101.

<sup>60</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” 14 November 2000, p. I-5 & 6.

<sup>61</sup> Clausewitz, p. 101.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

### Chapter IV – National Powers

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<sup>63</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, p. I-1.

<sup>64</sup> Director of National Intelligence, National Counter Terrorism Center, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," February 2003.

<sup>65</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, p. I-6.

<sup>66</sup> H. Norman Schwarzkopf, "It Doesn't Take a Hero," 1992, pp. 348,358, 522-547.

<sup>67</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," November 2002.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Naval War College, "Strategy and Force Planning," fourth edition, 2004, p. 258.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 259.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Gulf War, 10 Jan 2006, available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gulf\\_War&oldid=34572905](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gulf_War&oldid=34572905), accessed 11 Jan 06.

<sup>74</sup> Naval War College, p. 256.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 263.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 264.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 265.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, "The Practice of Diplomacy," Routledge: London, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>80</sup> Livingston Merchant, "New Techniques in Diplomacy," in Johnson, E. A. J. The Dimensions of Diplomacy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964, p. 121.

<sup>81</sup> Naval War College, p. 312.

<sup>82</sup> G. R. Berridge, "Diplomacy's Theory and Practice," London: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. 2-5.

<sup>83</sup> Naval War College, p. 314.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Clausewitz, p. 99.

<sup>86</sup> Michael Agnes, ed., "Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus," Second Edition, 2002, p. 329.

<sup>87</sup> Sun Tzu, Art of War, 2003, p. 33.

<sup>88</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations," 9 October 1998, p. vii.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p I-10.

<sup>90</sup> JP 1-02, p. 146.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 430.

<sup>92</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13, p. I-20.

<sup>93</sup> Department of Defense, "The National Military Strategy: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow," 2004.

<sup>94</sup> Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, "The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," March 2005.

<sup>95</sup> Department of Defense, "The National Military Strategy: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow," 2004.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, "Joint Operation Planning," Revision Third Draft (3), p. IV-31.

<sup>99</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counter Terrorism Center, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," February 2003.

<sup>100</sup> Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, ed, "Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges," National Defense University Press, 2004, pp. 125-141.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., pp. 128 & 129.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>103</sup> Microsoft Encarta, "Dictionary Tools," 2005.

<sup>104</sup> Pete Engardio, IdeasBooks, "Throwing Money-and Missing," Business Week, April 3, 2006, p. 132.

**Chapter IV – National Powers**

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<sup>105</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-01, “Joint and National Support to Military Operations,” pp. 7 & 8.

<sup>106</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-01, “Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” p. IV-1.

<sup>107</sup> Clausewitz, pp. 101 and 102.

<sup>108</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, p. I-4.

<sup>109</sup> Joseph P. Nye, “The Paradox of American Power,” Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 9.

<sup>110</sup> Naval War College, p. 314.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 315.

<sup>112</sup> Charles Krauthammer, “Don’t Believe the Hype. We’re Still No. 1: What the doomsayers don’t say: America is a marvel of creativity,” Time, February 13, 2006, p. 41.

<sup>113</sup> US Census Bureau, Question and Answer Center, “Foreign-born Population,” available from [http://ask.census.gov/cgi-bin/askcensus.cfg/php/enduser/std\\_adp.php?p\\_faqid=293&p\\_created=1077891509&p\\_sid=V8UrWx3i&p\\_lva=&p\\_sp=cF9zcmNoPTEmcF9zb3J0X2J5PSZwX2dyaWRzb3J0PSZwX3Jvd19jbnQ9NDAmcF9wcm9kcZ0mcF9jYXRzPSZwX3B2PSZwX2N2PSZwX3BhZ2U9MSZwX3NIYXjaF90ZXh0PWltbWlncmFudHM\\*&p\\_li=&p\\_topview=1](http://ask.census.gov/cgi-bin/askcensus.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=293&p_created=1077891509&p_sid=V8UrWx3i&p_lva=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPTEmcF9zb3J0X2J5PSZwX2dyaWRzb3J0PSZwX3Jvd19jbnQ9NDAmcF9wcm9kcZ0mcF9jYXRzPSZwX3B2PSZwX2N2PSZwX3BhZ2U9MSZwX3NIYXjaF90ZXh0PWltbWlncmFudHM*&p_li=&p_topview=1), accessed 27 Mar 06.

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

National security includes the defense of the US of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of US interests around the globe.

George W. Bush

The ability of the United States to influence events to its advantage worldwide depends in large measure on the will of its citizenry, the vitality of its societal institutions, the strength of its relations with like-minded multinational partners, and the effectiveness of the Government in employing the instruments of national power.<sup>114</sup>

Joint Publication 1-0

***Historical Use of the National Security Council***

The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President of the United States on the “integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation.”<sup>115</sup> Each President has his own methods to manage the office. Therefore, the NSC is flexible enough to be molded to meet the needs of the President’s efforts involving national security. Initially, President Truman (1947-1953) was leery of the NSC. Since he had adequate experience in foreign affairs he generally kept it at arms length. He took council from personnel close to him, such as George M. Elsey, Rear Admiral Robert Dennison, and W. Averell Harriman, to coordinate major foreign policy matters. It was not until the Korean War that Truman embraced the NSC.<sup>116</sup>

President Eisenhower (1953-1961) established the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which still exists.<sup>117</sup> Additionally, he convened a Planning Board of assistant secretaries from the representatives on the NSC. The board was chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its purpose was “to gather the policy views of each of the key cabinet departments on critical issues,”<sup>118</sup> review the issues, and identify points of disagreement.

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

These points were not to be watered down, but spelled out for debate by the NSC and resolved by the President.<sup>119</sup>

The Kennedy administration (1961-1963) replaced Eisenhower's long-range planning NSC system with "ad hoc inter-agency working groups functioning in a crisis management atmosphere."<sup>120</sup> Officials outside the Department of State often lead these interagency working groups. At the center of these efforts was the new position of National Security Advisor (NSA). Kennedy was accused of establishing a mini State Department. Advice from the working groups was often parochial. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy realized his security system was not adequate. He built a communications center to receive information in real time, around the clock. This later became known as the Situation Room. He then moved his NSA, deputy NSA, and the executive secretary of the NSA adjacent to the Situation Room. This new system served him well during the Cuban Missile Crisis.<sup>121</sup>

A senior officer in the Department of Defense stated that the National Security Council system is organized by each administration based on the needs of that President. It can grow or shrink in stature. It can be lead by a principal such as the Secretary of Defense or State or a trusted official from a "lesser" agency. The bottom line, though, is only the President establishes policy for the US; all others provide guidance on policy or implement policy. Therefore, it is the President who must determine how best to utilize all sources of national power.

***The Interagency Process at the National Level***

The National Command Authority (NCA) consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense. It is the NCA's responsibility to integrate the military source of

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

power with other instruments of power to protect US interests.<sup>122</sup> Currently, all sources of power are linked together via the National Security Council (NSC).

Under President George W. Bush's National Security Presidential Directive 1, members of the NSC include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Director of National Intelligence advises the NSC on intelligence matters and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises on military matters. The President's Chief of Staff, his counsel, and his advisory for economic policy are invited to all NSC meetings. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings that pertain to their area of expertise. Other executive department heads and agencies are invited to attend as appropriate.<sup>123</sup>

The NSC meets at the direction of and presided over by the President. During his absence and at his direction the Vice President may preside. With the direction of the President and in consultation with other regular attendees, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is responsible for the agenda, the necessary papers, and recording actions and decisions. The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shares these responsibilities when economic issues are addressed.<sup>124</sup>

The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is the senior interagency forum for the consideration of national security policy issues. Members of the PC include the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs as the chairman. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director for National Intelligence attend and give advice within their area of expertise. The Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

Security Affairs, in consultation with the members, is responsible for the NSC/PC agenda and ensuring the necessary papers are prepared. The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy will share these responsibilities when economic issues are addressed.<sup>125</sup>

According to a general officer who wishes to remain anonymous the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) serves as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for policy issues affecting security. The DC may prescribe and review the work of the NSC Policy Coordination Committees.<sup>126</sup> Also, before an issue reaches the NSC, it is first addressed in the DC. As the name implies, the Deputies Committee is made up of the deputies of the principals of the NSC. The Deputies Committee reviews, comments, and ensures that issues brought before the Principals Committee have been prepared for discussion. The Principals Committee reviews the issue. If the issue is complete, it is sent to the NSC. If it needs further work, it is sent back to the Deputies Committee to be readdressed.

All members are expected to attend. The NSC that President Bush has established is not a crisis management system. It mainly addresses issues such as homeland security, the expansion of NATO, China, Russia, etc. Consequently, the process is very slow. Additionally, seldom does any Principal's original position survive the entire process; most issues belong to the Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency; and, politics does not drive decisions. Also, the NSC meets to determine the direction the US needs to take on a particular issue. Once a direction is determined, responsibility is assigned to a principal member to resolve.

President Bush has established National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC) to manage the development and implementation of national

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

security policies for interagency operations. Policies developed must be reviewed by senior committees of the NSC system and approved by the President. There are currently six PCCs aligned according to the following regions:

- Europe and Eurasia
- Western Hemisphere
- East Asia
- South Asia
- Near East and North Africa
- Africa<sup>127</sup>

There are also eleven PCCs established for the following functional topics:

- Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations
- International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
- Global Environment
- International Finance
- Transnational Economic Issues
- Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness
- Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
- Arms Control
- Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence
- Records Access and Information Security<sup>128</sup>

As a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United the President created, in the NSC's image, the Homeland Security Council Organization to coordinate homeland security-related matters. Members of the Homeland Security Council (HSC) include the President, Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Other officers of the executive branch,

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

heads of executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials may be invited when appropriate.<sup>129</sup>

Much like the NSC, the HSC meets at the direction of the President. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, also known as the Homeland Security Advisor (HSA), is responsible for HSC's agenda, the preparation of necessary papers, and records Council actions and Presidential decisions. The HSC system also has a Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees. They operate in the same manner as the NCS/PC, DC, and PCCs. Currently there are eleven HSC PCCs:

- Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence
- Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation
- Law Enforcement and Investigation
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequences Management
- Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security
- Domestic Transportation Security
- Research and Development
- Medical and Public Health Preparedness
- Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management
- Economic Consequences
- Public Affairs

***Interagency Process at the Combatant Command Level***

National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD 1) and the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1 (HSPD 1) address how the interagency process will be worked at the national level. However, there are no directives or procedures that require unity of effort across the agencies at the strategic or operational levels. DoD joint publications espouse doctrine which integrates all national powers. For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton's introduction of JP 3 states that the "...overarching concepts and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint, interagency, and multinational operations."<sup>130</sup> Unfortunately, the

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

publication further states that the “Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands.”<sup>131</sup> It is a DoD document and applies only to the military at the combatant command level and below.

However, the need to incorporate national powers at the strategic and operational levels is understood. To this end, a prototype *advisory element*, called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), was proposed by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and directed by the NSC/DC. The JIACG is to be part of the combatant commander’s staff. The NSC/DC, however, limited its principal duties of countering terrorism.<sup>132</sup>

USJFCOM has subsequently proposed that the JIACG’s scope be increased to “integrate campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all US government agencies.”<sup>133</sup> It will be lead by a senior executive service or equivalent and integrated into the planning and operations section of the combatant commander’s staff.<sup>134</sup> It will be comprised of a 12-person staff of mostly civilian personnel who have a strong interagency background. They will be responsible for formulating, articulating, advocating, and implementing “the combatant commander’s policies, priorities, programs, and procedures for interagency engagement.”<sup>135</sup> Additionally, the JIACG will coordinate and train with crisis response organizations to improve response capabilities.<sup>136</sup>

The JIACG is to address the gap that lies between the civilian and military campaign planning processes. To do so, it will:

- Participate in theater strategic engagement, deliberate, crisis action, transition, and reconstruction planning and operations.

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

- Inform the combatant commander and the joint task force of civilian agency campaign planning, sensitivities, and support requirements, capabilities, and limitations.
- Inform civilian agencies of the combatant commander's and the joint task force's operational requirements, concerns, capabilities, and limitations.<sup>137</sup>

The JIACG will not infringe on the combatant commander's responsibilities, nor will it supersede current civilian authorities. To that end, the JIACG will not:

- Replace any civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the combatant commander's staff or bypass any existing civilian agency lines of authority and communications.
- Provide civilian agency concurrence to internal Department of Defense staffing actions.
- Interfere with existing memorandums of understanding and agreed-practices for requests for assistance and other formalized interagency request processes.
- Challenge or replace the statutory and presidential-directed relationships for developing, implementing, or executing US national security and foreign policy.<sup>138</sup>

***Conclusion***

Integration of security at the national level is a process directed by the President of the United States. It varies from administration to administration based upon the President's needs, policies, and desired operational design. The National Security Council System is the tool the President uses to focus America's national powers. Today it primarily addresses long-term issues such as Chinese expansionism, the North Korean threat to South Korea, and the Iranian nuclear program. Issues that require direct action are generally assigned to a US agency or department to resolve. As a result, problems are often stovepipped and, as a result, the process does not effectively synchronize all sources of national power.

At the strategic and operational level of policy implementation, the NSC directed that combatant commanders implement the JIACG concept to integrate national powers.<sup>139</sup>

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

This advisory element encourages habitual collaboration to ensure interagency understanding. Additionally, the JIACG is to integrate campaign planning throughout all US government agencies. The bottom line is that the JIACG is an advisory element and is not directive in nature. It will not bypass any existing civilian agency lines.<sup>140</sup> As a result, integration of national powers or agency unity of effort is not mandated. The most recent example is Operation Iraqi Freedom. After cities and towns were cleared of Saddam Hussein operatives, civil operations were not led by the Department of State, but by the Department of Defense. Unit commanders were designated as mayors, required to rebuild infrastructures and manage day-to-day governmental activities, skills that primarily reside in the civilian sector, not the military. The Department of State and other government agencies, for whatever reason, were noticeably absent.

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<sup>114</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare and the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 November 2000, p. I-5 & 6.

<sup>115</sup> The White House, "History of the National Security Council 1947-1997," obtained from <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/NSChistory.html> accessed on 26 January 2006.

<sup>116</sup> The White House, "History of the National Security Council 1947-1997.

<sup>117</sup> David J. Rothkopf, "Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power," Public Affairs, 2005, p. 65.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> The White House, "History of the National Security Council 1947-1997."

<sup>121</sup> Rothkopf, pp. 85-92.

<sup>122</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, p. I-6.

<sup>123</sup> The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 1, "Organization of the National Security System," 13 February 2001.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 1.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System," September 2004.

<sup>130</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>132</sup> Harold Van Opdorp, LtCol, USMC, "The Joint Interagency Coordination Group: The Operationalization of DIME," Small Wars Journal Magazine, July 2003.

<sup>133</sup> US Joint Forces Command, Fact Sheet, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)," January 2005.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

**Chapter V – Current Interagency Security Process**

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Opdorp.

<sup>140</sup> US Joint Forces Command, Fact Sheet, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), January 2005.

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions that are designated in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.<sup>141</sup>

Carl von Clausewitz

Designing a campaign focused upon a military Strategic Objective is fraught with risk, since it is likely to lead to a narrower appreciation of the role performed and to a misunderstanding of how the instruments of power must work together in a synergistic fashion to achieve the maximum result in the shortest period of time with the least expenditure of resources.<sup>142</sup>

Patrick C. Sweeney

***Introduction***

Current efforts to focus and integrate America's national powers are wrought with parochialism and a lack of coordinating, enforceable directives. They have dissimilar, and "sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which make unity of effort a challenge."<sup>143</sup> When asked how healthy the interagency process was a senior general in the Army stated that it was in need of major surgery. Another senior officer, also requesting to remain anonymous, essentially stated that nothing in the process is accurate and that there were no policies that direct how to conduct the interagency process.

America has a poor history of coordinating its actions, integrating its strategies, and synchronizing policy.<sup>144</sup> As a result, there are several issues that need to be resolved in order to properly focus America's national powers. At the national, strategic, and operational levels there should be a unifying element for policy, budgeting, and planning. Another way of saying this is that the ends, means, and ways for protecting America's way of life should not be developed individually by each of the country's national powers. Currently decision making is stovepiped which results in piecemealed responses by the

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

various US agencies.<sup>145</sup> The ends for the Department of Defense should be the same as the ends of the Department of State. The tools to achieve those ends may be different, but the ends laid out in the National Security Strategy are the same for all sources of power. The means should be looked at from a national security perspective, not fought over for parochial biases by DoD, DoS, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, et al. America's economic source of power is not limitless. Therefore, it should be divvied up with a common purpose where identified risks or shortfalls are accepted by the President of the United States.

Likewise, Congress should fund involvement in national security issues beyond day-to-day operations conducted by each source of power. The ways or tools may be different for each source of power, but the funding should be available to obtain the tools needed to achieve the common endstate established in the NSS. Additionally, each source of power should develop a national strategy which states not only how it will support the NSS, but also how it will be synchronized and nested with all other sources of power. For example, the DoS should have a similar strategy as DoD's National Defense Strategy; and, they should be nested. The NSC should review and comment on these agency or department strategies to ensure they fulfill the needs of the NSS.

Currently, according to General Goodall, retired US Air Force, the NSS does apply to other government agencies. However, application of it beyond DoD "receives little or no visibility in budget priorities, and therefore, the resource allocation process. This in turn results in little or no effort in budget execution."<sup>146</sup> Finally, this unifying element for policy, budgeting, and planning should have the authority to tell the government's various

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

agencies to get the job done. The agencies should not be able to choose to cooperate or not when it comes to national security matters.

***National Level Interagency Operations***

The NSC should be responsible for synchronizing national powers through a Deputies Committee. A new position should be created within each Department entitled the Assistant Secretary for Interagency Management. This Deputies Committee would operate as the National Interagency Coordination Group (NIACG), similar to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group at the COCOM level.<sup>147</sup> The NIACG would be made up of the deputies of the principals of the NSC to include the Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director of the Office of management and Budget, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor. The Deputy National Security Advisor should serve as the chair.

The NIACG would be the lead for developing the interagency ends and ways. Additionally, the NIACG would provide legislative and budgetary recommendations/solutions to the President through the NSC/PC where shortfalls appear. They would review agency strategies for feasibility and compliance with the NSS. Additionally, the NIACG would be responsible for ensuring that national powers are synchronized within campaign plans. To do this they would develop doctrine similar to JP 5-00.1. It could be called the Interagency Publication 5-00.1, Interagency Doctrine for Campaign Planning.

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

The six-phased campaign plan should be a civil-political-military (civil-pol-mil) plan. It would be the tool to focus, nest, and synchronize US powers for complex contingency operations. Currently, according to Joint Publication 1-02, a campaign plan is a “series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.”<sup>148</sup> It should be redefined to a series of related operations utilizing national powers to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. The campaign plan should not be a tool solely used by the Department of Defense. Nor should it be viewed as a product to be refined and implemented once a crisis has developed. It should be implemented immediately upon approval so that Phase 0, Shaping, follows a preplanned design. Like DoD’s adaptive planning process, it should be routinely reviewed for currency.

No one source of power should be proponent for the entire campaign. The responsibility for each phase should be as follows:

- Phase 0 – (Shape, prevent, prepare) Department of State leads. All other sources of power will support.
- Phase I – (Deter tension) Department of State leads. All other sources of power will support.
- Phase II – (Seize Initiative – polarization, crisis) Department of Defense leads. All other sources of power will support.
- Phase III – (Dominate – conflict) Department of Defense leads. All other sources of power will support.
- Phase IV – (Stabilize – transition) Department of State leads. All other sources of power will support.
- Phase V – (Enable Civil Authority) Department of State leads. All other sources of power will support.

*“We plan because synergy does not happen by itself. Synchronization does not happen by accident. For synchronization, coordination, [and] integration to take place, planning is required.”*

**VADM Vern Clark, USN**

From Joint Publication 1<sup>49</sup>

The NIACG would identify the need for a civil-pol-mil campaign plan to be written by the regional level element. It would then review all of these plans for feasibility, accuracy, and supportability. They would ensure that all appropriate sources of power were included in the development of the plan. Plans with major shortfalls would be returned to the regional interagency element for correction. Minor issues would be noted and forwarded to the PC for final approval and funding recommendations. Issues that remain after the regional element has reworked the plan would be addressed by the NSC/PC; the NSC/DC would resolve issues the NSC/PC could not. The NSC/DC would approve and endorse all civil-pol-mil campaign plans and return them to the regional interagency element for implementation.

***Regional Level Interagency Operations***

At the regional level the NSC/DC has approved the implementation of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as part of the combatant commander's staff. Its principal duties are to synchronize the counter terrorism effort. As stated in Chapter 5, USJFCOM has proposed that the JIACG's scope be increased to “integrate campaign

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all US government agencies.<sup>150</sup> According to USJFCOM, they would be responsible for formulating, articulating, advocating, and implementing “the combatant commander’s policies, priorities, programs, and procedures for interagency engagement.”<sup>151</sup> This is too myopic in scope. There should be a JIACG at the combatant command or regional level, however, not as part of the COCOM staff. The JIACG should be a subordinate element of the NSC so that neither one source of power (in this case, the Military) nor one particular phase of the campaign plan (in this case, Phase III, Conflict Domination) becomes overriding and receives greater emphasis over all other phases. The JIACG’s primary duties should be to synchronize and nest of all sources of power by developing campaign plans to meet NIACG endstates.

USJFCOM has recommended that the JIACG be managed by an SES and staffed by twelve people with strong interagency backgrounds. This is insufficient. It should be staffed and alternately lead by people from DoD and DoS. The staff should be organized similar to the way General Eisenhower organized his staff during World War II, which is to say that if there is a DoD person in charge, there must be a DoS person as the deputy and vice versa if somebody from DoS is the lead. The personnel would not be permanently stationed within the JIACG, but rotated as DoD and DoS currently rotate their personnel. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the JIACG is manned by personnel who have a vested interest in their parent agency and that the parent agency has a vested interest in the success of JIACG.

Additionally, there needs to be a means to ensure that interagency thinkers and planners are not punished for working outside of their parent organization. Interagency

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

planners should be rewarded and promoted equally with their State, Joint, and Service brethren. Beyond DoS and DoD, all other sources of nation power would have positions within the JIACG's plans section. They may be temporary or permanent positions, depending on regional needs.

As stated in chapter V, there are no directives or procedures that direct unity of effort across the agencies at the strategic or operational levels. The National Interagency Coordination Group should ensure that these directives are developed for implementation by all sources of power, NSC and below. Currently, DoD joint publications espouse doctrine which integrates all national powers. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton in his introduction of JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, states that the “overarching concepts and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint, interagency, and multinational operations.”<sup>152</sup> Unfortunately, the publication further states that the “Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands.”<sup>153</sup> Joint publications are DoD documents and apply only to the military at the combatant command level and below.

The Department of State needs to establish regional authorities similar to the COCOMs, less NORTHCOM. This would align DoS with DoD and would support a seamless operational planning process. These regional authorities would be able to speak for and commit DoS to regional or operational campaign plans. Of course, the NSC through the NIACG approves these plans. Once a campaign plan is approved, it should

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

become the mandate of all appropriate sources of power to fund and support.

Additionally, Phase 0 should be implemented upon approval.

According to the US Joint Forces Command Fact Sheet “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG),” the JIACG is to address the gap that lies between the civilian and military campaign planning processes.<sup>154</sup> Again this is limited in scope. The JIACG should not just address the gap that lies between the civilian and military campaign planning processes, but should close the gap. To that end, it should:

- Participate in theater strategic engagement, deliberate, crisis action, transition, and reconstruction planning and operations.
- Participate in regional exercises to validate the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of established campaign plans.
- Participate in regional exercises to train or maintain the expertise to support established campaign plans.
- Require the combatant commander’s planning staff to wear two hats – one as JIACG planners and the other as COCOM planners.
- Require the regional DoS planning staff to wear two hats – one as JIACG planners and the other as DoS planners.
- Inform the combatant commander of operational requirements, concerns, civilian sensitivities, support requirements, and capabilities and limitations.
- Inform the regional DoS authority and other interagency partners of operational requirements, concerns, military sensitivities, support requirements, and capabilities and limitations.

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

- Develop regional/operational campaign plans to meet NIACG established endstates.
- Require DoS and DoD personnel to assume the lead in planning assigned phases of the campaign plan.
- Establish memorandums of understanding for requests for assistance between agencies.

The JIACG will not infringe on the combatant commander's responsibilities, nor will it supersede current civilian authorities. To that end, the JIACG would not:

- Replace any civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the combatant commander's staff or bypass any existing civilian agency lines of authority and communications.
- Provide civilian agency concurrence to internal Department of Defense staffing actions.
- Provide concurrence to internal Department of State staffing actions.
- Challenge or replace the statutory and presidential-directed relationships for developing, implementing, or executing US national security and foreign policy.
- Preclude COCOM or DoS operational planning beyond that required by the NSS, NDS, or NIACG.

***Opposing Thoughts***

Focusing America's national powers will come at some cost. For one, it may put a non-elected person into a potentially very powerful position. One person, with all of this authority, may abuse it and put the United States more in harms way than with the current process. Another issue is that this will come at a higher cost to the taxpayer. Congress

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

will have to find a way to significantly increase the capability of DoS and other sources of power. Unless they cut spending for the Department of Defense to fund others, programs outside of national security will have to be reduced. If DoD is cut, will the military still be able to succeed against the most dangerous scenario against the US – total warfare with a country like China? Is the US willing to reduce the “M” in DIME in favor of policy that aims to prevent all warfare? Another possible risk is that this may increase the overall bureaucracy by adding another layer of government and make the national security even less efficient.

These issues, and most likely several others, must be addressed before the implementation of this “new way of operating.” However, they are a small price to pay for an even greater return on national security. In the end, the more nations and states that embrace human dignity, self-governing democratic institutions, and market economies the less likely the military will be the power of choice to impose another’s will. An interdependent secure world of nations and states will have evolved whose people will be created equal and endowed with certain unalienable rights; among them would be life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

***Effecting Change***

Change will not happen quickly. It will take longer, or might not happen at all, if it is forced or the culture is non-receptive. On a wall of the library at the Joint Forces Staff College is a quote from then Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.” Yet this single concentrated, joint effort is still not as instinctive in the US military as combined arms

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

operations is at integrating artillery, armor, engineering, etc into plans and operations within Army and Marine Corps planning. Interagency synchronization needs to be as instinctive as combined arms operations. To get there, interagency, along with joint, combined, and coalition synchronization should be marketed, sold, and accepted as the required methods for planning the employment of all national powers as its doctrine is developed and implemented. DoD, seeing at least the need for interagency cooperation, has attempted to force the process by placing it into military doctrine. For example, JP 3-0 states that the “intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.”<sup>155</sup>

Though military doctrine addresses the employment of the best qualified source of power, it is the military that ends up being the “go-to” agency for the USG. DoD has the capacity, resources, and funding to address just about any national problem. But, are they always the right tool or the right image for the job? Where is the line drawn between the stick and the carrot? Ultimately, the NSC through the NIACG and JIACGs will determine this. However, in any situation, effective interagency operations will not happen until DoD is able to step aside and give up power and probably funding to other elements of national power as appropriate, and the other elements of power are able to stand up and fully assume responsibility of their role in national security. When this happens, the USG will be able plan for and employ the best qualified source of power toward its objectives at the appropriate time and place. Congress should support this by funding the planning process and the capacity for the execution of the nation’s security strategy.

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

The following are a few additional concerns that need to be addressed to fully synchronize and nest national powers:

**DoS and DoD Culture**

Dr. Barbara Stephenson, Director of Planning, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State, pointed out the following in reference to the differences in culture between DoS and DoD:

“Unlike the military, which is staffed to allow for something like 80% of a person’s career to be spent training and planning, State is so thinly staffed that it sustains routine staffing gaps. In the scramble for qualified people to do State’s core business—round up votes in the UN to pressure Iran, convince a foreign government to change its laws to permit more favorable access for U.S. imports, shame a foreign government into improving human rights practices, cajole a foreign government into sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the list goes on—or take part in planning, particularly a military planning process with rather limited applicability to State’s core business, day-to-day business wins out over planning. State has very few personnel dedicated to planning.”<sup>156</sup>

In other words, planning within DoS is a second rate job. Planning is not the career path one takes to the upper levels of DoS.

Dr. Stephenson then explained that the primary process DoS follows is reactionary rather than proactive. Therefore, very little planning or anticipation is done to preclude negative issues. Another example of how little DoS thinks of DoD’s planning processes is Mr. William Vancio, Special Agent with DoS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, was warned by colleagues, prior to attending the Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, not to “go native.” What is meant by this is if he takes on a DoD persona as a result of attending this course it will not be well received within DoS circles. It would not do well for his career. To further emphasize this fear of DoD, Mr. Vancio stated that in DoS’s eyes it is preferable to take on the character of or become sympathetic

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

to (i.e., “go native” in) the country of assignment rather than to assume a DoD character.<sup>157</sup> There are strengths within DoD that DoS should emulate, specifically staff operations such as campaign planning and the execution of operations. Another trait within DoS’s culture that may need to be modified in order to achieve synergy with all sources of power is their tendency to be the independent voice of the President of the United States. DoS needs to realize they are one source of power attempting to achieve the goals established for all sources of power within the NSS.

On the military side, arrogance, probably wanted and needed, permeates DoD. The military believes it can do anything it sets its mind to do. This should change at least at the operational and strategic level so the military integrally believes it can do anything kinetic and needs the other sources of power to achieve the national endstate. During a briefing by a DoS official to an audience that was predominantly DoD officers from major to colonel it was suggested by a civilian audience member that the endstate of DoS was the same as DoD’s. There were several voices from the military officers indicating that this was not true. This needs to change. In fact, according to the briefer, State and DoD seek the same endstate abroad, namely stable democratic partners who are allies advancing common interests.

If sources of power are not united, they may work against each other, work in opposite directions, or conduct redundant operations squandering limited resources. Within DoD planning is a sought after skill. Planning drives the process – from force structure to employment of capabilities to national security strategies. However, the approach DoD often takes is to “treat warfare as a near autonomous activity, all but separate from its political purposes and consequences.”<sup>158</sup> This attitude also needs to

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

change. As Clausewitz pointed out approximately two hundred years ago, war is an instrument of policy and policy is developed and pursued by the government.<sup>159</sup> DoD needs to treat warfare as only one way to bend an adversary's will. DoD also needs to understand that they can and should support and empower other national powers in assuming their national security responsibilities.

**Campaign Planning to Shape the World**

In essence the campaign plan is a tool to focus national powers to shape a threat to meet the will of the US, which is national security. Phase 0 within the six-phased campaign plan construct is designated the shaping phase. DoS has the expertise to lead this phase. All other sources of power should support DoS. The Department of State can mold or shape other states in a peaceful or coercive diplomatic manner to meet the goals of the NSS. The endstate of this phase should be to “enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to US foreign policy, security, or economic interests,”<sup>160</sup> and are viable democratic states with market economies. If Phase 0 fails, Phase I, Deter Tensions would be implemented. Phase I’s goals should be to shape the current issue away from escalation back to Phase 0. Should Phase I fail, Phase II, Seize the Initiative, would be implemented. The goal of Phase II should be to stabilize the crisis and prevent war, ultimately moving back to Phase 0. Should Phase II fail, Phase III, Dominate the Conflict or war, would be implemented. The goal of phase III should be to fight and win the war, ultimately shaping the threat to meet US requirements. Once Phase

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

III's endstate has been met, Phase IV, Stabilization and Transition, will be implemented.

According to National Security Presidential Directive 44, "the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."<sup>161</sup> The goal of Phase IV is to completely end hostilities, "promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economy, the rule of law"<sup>162</sup> and transition to Phase V, Enable Civil Authorities. The goal of Phase V should be the same as Phase 0's goal, which is to "enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to US foreign policy, security, or economic interests"<sup>163</sup> and are viable democratic states with market economies.

This is somewhat of a simplification of the campaign plan. Not all phases start and end cleanly. For example, Phase IV can begin while Phase III is ongoing. Once offensive operations have moved through an area, Phase IV should be immediately implemented to ensure a quick transition to Phase V. Additionally, there will be diverging efforts within and outside of each source of power during each phase. For example, Phase 0 DoS's main effort, supported by other sources of power, should be to shape a state in a non-threatening, non-kinetic manner. DoD should support DoS's effort, also in a non-kinetic manner but it also should be shaping the environment should Phase III be required. Examples of this would be mil-to-mil exercises, host nation agreements, and allies and coalition development. Once the National Command Authorities implement Phase III, there is no substitute for complete success. However, it is probably far less costly in terms

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

of lives and other limited resources to ensure success in Phase 0 than it is to destroy a country and then pay to rebuild it.

**Training**

Traditionally, other than initial entry training and leadership management, education within the Department of State is limited. Generally, the individual either obtains an advanced education prior to employment or, achieves it on his or her own. DoS should change its approach and incorporate training for professional growth and development. At the mid and advanced level of one's career there are at least three subjects that should be addressed. The first is the history of DoS. With the study of history, the individual learns the evolution of the Department. Individuals can theorize about approaches or actions that went poorly and well. Theory can be a tool to make history understandable and useful. It helps to create and shape doctrine; and, therefore, the future of the department. It also helps the future leader to sort through the complex decision-making processes necessary during crises. A leader who possesses both an understanding of theory and a familiarity with a variety of historical case studies is at a distinct advantage in solving problems.<sup>164</sup> The second area of study should be doctrine. Doctrine as defined by JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, slightly modified to fit DoS is “fundamental principles by which the... [Department of State] guide[s] their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”<sup>165</sup> Another way of looking at doctrine is that it is a means to achieve common thought, purpose, and understanding to guide actions to meet required objectives. It would unite the Department to achieve presidential directives. Doctrine, as

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

it is applied within DoD, would not necessarily be directive in nature. Evolution and transformation will infuse new processes, which will change or modify doctrine.

The third subject which should be addressed is planning. A common planning process establishes a means to identify all required actions and all required supporting actions it takes to meet an objective. The planning process will ensure that nothing is overlooked to include Department capabilities and limitations and opposing capabilities. Gaps in capabilities can be filled by higher or accepted as risks. Finally, most plans will not survive much longer after implementation. But, they are a means to focus on an agreed upon endstate, identify gaps in resources and intelligence, and a point that can be deviated from as long as all involved understand the purpose that must be achieved.

The Department of Defense generally includes this training in their mid and advanced level professional education but, it predominantly emphasizes the military source of power. In order to become synchronized with other agencies, DoD should support with funding and instructors an Advanced National Security Interagency College (ANSIC). ANSIC would present subjects similar to those of the Joint Forces Staff College's, Joint Advanced Warfighting School. However, it would emphasize interagency operations rather than joint or service operations. Billets would be filled by DoS, DoD, and other sources of power on a one third, one third, and one third basis. Fifty-one percent of graduates must fill interagency positions such as the NIACG or JIACG. Additionally, DoD needs to be receptive to assisting and mentoring other sources of power such as DoS in their efforts to incorporate professional development in their training programs.

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating****Civilian Deployments**

Since civilians embedded within a large portion of America's national powers and government they should be required sign a contract prior to employment with a government agency which states that they will, if requested, deploy to hazardous duty stations. Those who deploy should be given all the honors, rights, and protection military service members receive as a result of deployments – tax-free pay, recognition for support of the country, access to DoD facilities, etc. Additionally, prior to employment they should be made fully aware of oath taking to serve the nation, and that this means that they will selflessly work to ensure that the national security requirements established by the leaders appointed above them are met to the fullest of their capability. This could and would if required mean deployment to hostile zones. Also, leaders must understand be held responsible for the lives of those appointed below them and that negligent actions will be held against them.

**National Risk**

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (ret.), Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, describes the US as a one-armed Cyclops. By this he means that the military source of power “has been developed, resourced, and honed at the expense of other elements of national power.”<sup>166</sup> As a result, the US is assuming risk in its ability to synchronize and use to their fullest extent all other sources of power. Consequently, for the US, when issues become too difficult, or seemingly out of control, the power of choice to persuade or shape the issue at hand is the military. This projects a bullish or brutish image to the rest of the world. The US must empower its other strengths

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

not just to be better received, but to obtain a synergistic effect of all powers. The US must only use its military strength when all other options have failed.

Funding is another area the US has taken on a large risk. If an issue is not foreseen, monies are not readily available within DoS. According to a briefing presented by a DoS official to the Joint Forces Staff College, State has very little in the way of contingency funds, either at the embassies or in Washington. State must go to Congress for approval for additional funds when needed. This process can easily take more than 18 months because of the budget cycle. A lot can happen in two years. Funds are available for the military should an unforeseeable issue arise. Contingency funds need to be available to DoS so they can quickly address a difficult issue and hopefully prevent it from escalating to a military issue.

***Conclusion***

As stated earlier, current efforts to focus and integrate America's national powers are wrought with parochialism and a lack of coordinating, enforceable directives. The NSC needs to modify its efforts to take full advantage of all sources of power to secure America's way of life by first establishing an NSC/DC as the NIACG whose mandate is to manage the interagency process. The NIACG should use the six-phased campaign plan as the tool to coordinate and synchronize all capabilities. It would do this by identifying and approving campaign plans written by regional JIACGs. It also must ensure that interagency doctrine is developed to achieve unity of effort by establishing common thought, purpose, and understanding to guide actions to meet required objectives. The NSC should also develop JIACGs to coordinate and synchronized national powers at the regional or combatant command level. The JIACGs should be manned by all sources of

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

powers, but predominantly by DoS and DoD. DoD's and DoS's culture needs to change to embrace all sources of power. DoD needs to step aside and allow other sources of power to fully contribute towards the national security effort. Additionally, all other sources of power need to stand up and accept their responsibility. Also, an interagency college needs to be established so that mid- and senior-level interagency leaders are schooled in theory and doctrine and that they obtain the planning skills necessary to synchronize all sources of power. And finally, Congress needs to empower all sources of power by making funds available for emergency or contingency requirements.

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<sup>141</sup> Clausewitz, p. 105.

<sup>142</sup> Patrick C. Sweeney, Effects-Based Confusion: The Missing Link with Operational Art, p. 4.

<sup>143</sup> Department of Defense, (Draft) Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Revision Second Draft) XX 2005, p. II-9.

<sup>144</sup> Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the US Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 39, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, p. 52.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>146</sup> Harry Goodall, retired US Air Force General, Senior Fellow to the Joint Forces Staff College, mentoring of the Joint Anti-warfare School, Seminar 2, 21 February 2006.

<sup>147</sup> Michael M. Dunn, Lt Gen, President of the National Defense University, in a briefing given to the Joint Forces Staff College, "Leading in the Interagency Arena: A DoD Perspective," 25 January 2006, presented the idea of a National Interagency Coordination Group.

<sup>148</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," p. 76.

<sup>149</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," p. V-1.

<sup>150</sup> US Joint Forces Command, Fact Sheet, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), January 2005.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 10 September 2001.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>154</sup> US Joint Forces Command, Fact Sheet, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)," January 2005.

<sup>155</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 10 September 2001, p. viii and ix.

<sup>156</sup> Barbara Stephenson, PhD, US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Director, Planning, briefing given to the Joint Forces Staff College, "USG Interagency Planning," 1 February 2006.

<sup>157</sup> William Vancio,

<sup>158</sup> Anthony D. McIvor, ed, "Rethinking the Principles of War," Naval Institute Press, p. 34.

<sup>159</sup> Clausewitz, On War, 1976, p. 101.

<sup>160</sup> The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," December 7, 2005.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

**Chapter VI – A New Way of Operating**

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<sup>164</sup> Department of Defense, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Directorate of Nonresident Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Training Year 2003, Phase 1, M600, Lesson 1, p. ADV1-5.

<sup>165</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," p. 168.

<sup>166</sup> Michael P. Noonan, Rapporteur, "The Future of American Military Strategy," A Conference Report.

**Chapter VII – Conclusion**

Since the fall of the Soviet Union the challenges that face the United States have significantly changed. The US is the only superpower. With this status comes the responsibility to be patient, to extend helping hands, to foster the good in international relations, and to sacrifice, often with its own blood, to protect those in need as well as its own security. Also, a burden that comes with this status is envy from much of the rest of the world. Many want what the US is perceived to have, which is freedom and riches. Additionally, in competition for the world's resources, many would like to see the US humbled. However, there is no other nation that can stand toe-to-toe and challenge the US. Consequently, those who endeavor to attack the US have had to change tactics and attack using unconventional means such as terrorism. As a result, the US needs to develop tactics to meet this threat.

The difficulty with changing tactics is that, even with the vast resources of the United States, its coffers are finite. As a result, intelligent and insightful decisions need to be made as to how best to protect US interests and defend against future threats. These are political decisions. To start with, the nation's political leaders need to define the threat. Will the most likely future threat be similar to Napoleon's conscripted million-man army, to the hundreds of thousands raised by the North and South during America's Civil War, to the millions who fought during WW I and WW II, or to the hundreds of thousands who fought during the Gulf War in 1991? Or will the future threat be similar to the army that George Washington raised to fight the British during America's Revolutionary War, or the North Vietnamese when they fought the US, or similar to Osama bin Laden's attack of the US on September 11, 2001? The answer to this question will determine the type of military force the US needs to develop.

**Chapter VII – Conclusion**

Another question that should be given some thought is what exactly is war?

Clausewitz said that war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do the other's will. So, do wars have to be kinetic? Wills can be compelled using diplomacy or finance or with key intelligence. So, the answer to what is war and the answer to what is the future threat can focus America's leaders in determining what strategy to take in order to protect national security. This, in turn, will determine which capability or source of power is necessary to best obtain capitulation of the enemy.

The September 2002 National Security Strategy essentially defined the current threat as terrorists, rogue states, non-state actors, and religious extremists. A significant method in addressing these threats is to shape the environment to prevent their emergence. As such, the NSS attempts to unite and transform not just the military, but also all elements of national power to focus against these actors. All of America's sources of power – for this paper: military, information, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, economic, the will of the people, and America's culture – need to unite and synchronize their efforts to support the NSS.

To synchronize the sources of power America's political leaders first need to empower them with the capability to not only support each other as required, but also to lead as necessary to bend or shape an aggressor's will in favor of the United States. Secondly, America's political leaders should require and fund the means necessary to synergize these powers through synchronization and nesting. At the national level, the NSC should be responsible for achieving this synergistic effort through a National Interagency Coordination Group (NIACG). The NIACG would be staffed by the deputies of the principal members of the NSC. They would be responsible for approving and

**Chapter VII – Conclusion**

implementing interagency campaign plans. They would also ensure that the endstates of all campaign plans meet those established by the NSS. Additionally, the NIACG should ensure that interagency doctrine is developed to achieve common thought, purpose, understanding and direction. Within this doctrine the NIACG should identify the current six-phased campaign plan as the tool to synchronize all national powers.

At the regional level, a Joint Interagency Coordination Groups should be established. The JIACG would be subordinate to the NIACG with primary duties of synchronizing and nesting all sources of power by developing campaign plans to meet the goals established by the NIACG and the NSS. The JIACG should be manned with planners from the COCOM staff as well as from DoS and other powers. The JIACG should close the gap that currently lies between the civilian and military campaign planning processes. To that end, it should:

- Participate in theater strategic engagement, deliberate, crisis action, transition, and reconstruction planning and operations.
- Participate in regional exercises to validate the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of established campaign plans.
- Participate in regional exercises to train or maintain the expertise to support established campaign plans.
- Require the combatant commander's planning staff to wear two hats – one as JIACG planners and the other as COCOM planners.
- Require the regional DoS planning staff to wear two hats – one as JIACG planners and the other as DoS planners.
- Inform the combatant commander of operational requirements, concerns, civilian sensitivities, support requirements, and capabilities and limitations.
- Inform the regional DoS authority and other interagency partners of operational requirements, concerns, military sensitivities, support requirements, and capabilities and limitations.
- Develop regional/operational campaign plans to meet NIACG established endstates.
- Require DoS and DoD personnel to assume the lead in planning assigned phases of the campaign plan.
- Establish memorandums of understanding for requests for assistance between agencies.

**Chapter VII – Conclusion**

In the end, it will be the American populace that determines how to best protect national interests by electing the leadership that employs their will. However, at the present time, America's national powers are wrought with parochialism and a lack of coordinating, enforceable directives. It would be criminal to allow status quo to continue. It should not take another catastrophic event such as 9/11, or worse yet, a WMD event that might destroy an entire city before the US implements change. These NIACG and JIACG recommendations will synchronize and nest all national powers in an attempt to shape the enemy towards America's will, save lives and money in attempting to prevent kinetic war, and, if war is necessary, quickly resolve it and move efforts to continue shaping the environment towards representative governments with market economies.

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